ZIRCONIUM is a threat group operating out of China, active since at least 2017, that has targeted individuals associated with the 2020 US presidential election and prominent leaders in the international affairs community.[1][2]
29
Techniques65th pct
11
Tactics66th pct
0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
ZIRCONIUM has created a run key named Dropbox Update Setup to mask a persistence mechanism for a malicious binary.9
Stealth4 detection rules
Standing G0128
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this group touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 176 ATT&CK groups only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques2965th pct
65th percentile · 65% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics1166th pct
66th percentile · 66% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many tactics spanned or fewer.
Tools & malware0Bottom 9%
9th percentile · 91% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tools and malware.
Campaigns089% tie · 4 values
89% of the population shares a single value across only 4 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique13med37th pct
37th percentile · 63% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique4med
ZIRCONIUM detections G0128
638 distinct rules cover the 29 techniques recorded for this group. 411 Sigma · 227 Splunk.
24 covered by at least one rule5 with no coverage638 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 600+ rules
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MITRE ATT&CK
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ID
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Detects file access requests to browser credential stores by uncommon processes. (...)
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Detects the Linux-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency by Axios NPM package, including payload download via curl and detached execution using nohup and python3. (...)
Detects the macOS-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency in Axios NPM Package, including AppleScript execution via osascript, payload download, permission modification, execution, and cleanup.
This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Azure AD Health service agents (e.g AD FS). (...)
The following analytic detects the use of CertUtil.exe with the 'decode' argument, which may indicate an attempt to decode a previously encoded file, potentially containing malicious payloads. (...)
The following analytic identifies the execution of the "whoami" command with the "/group" flag, where the results are passed to the "find" command in order to look for a the string "12288". (...)
This analytic detects potential reconnaissance activities on Cisco ASA devices by identifying execution of multiple information-gathering "show" commands within a short timeframe. (...)
This analytic detects unexpected outbound network connections initiated by known webserver processes such as `httpd.exe`, `nginx.exe`, or `tomcat.exe` to common file sharing or public content hosting services like GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin. (...)
The following analytic detects potential reverse shell activity by identifying connections involving ports commonly associated with remote access tools, shell listeners, or tunneling utilities. (...)
The following analytic detects connections with a high Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) threat confidence score, indicating potentially malicious behavior within encrypted traffic. (...)
The following analytic detects potentially suspicious large volumes of data sent by the connection initiator on flows from internal to external networks. (...)