tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

Compromise Software Supply Chain T1195.002

sub-technique of T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

Tactic: Initial Access
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Version: 1.1
Created: 11 March 2020
Last modified: 24 October 2025

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsTop 20%

Threat groups80th percentile · 80% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.

CampaignsTop 17%

Campaigns83rd percentile · 83% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.

Tools & malware57th pct

Tools & malware57th percentile · 57% of ATT&CK techniques have this many tools implementing them or fewer.

Detection rulesTop 11%

Detection rules89th percentile · 89% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

Compromise Software Supply Chain MITRE reference T1195.002

Top 20%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups

9 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.

Moonstone SleetG1036 ↗

Has distributed a trojanized version of PuTTY software for initial access to victims.1

created 2024-08-261 referenceaka Storm-1789

DaggerflyG1034 ↗

Is associated with several supply chain compromises using malicious updates to compromise victims.1 2

created 2024-07-252 referencesaka Evasive Panda

GOLD SOUTHFIELDG0115 ↗

Has distributed ransomware by backdooring software installers via a strategic web compromise of the site hosting Italian WinRAR.1 2 3

created 2020-09-223 referencesaka Pinchy Spider

APT41G0096 ↗

Gained access to production environments where they could inject malicious code into legitimate, signed files and widely distribute them to end users.1

created 2019-09-231 referenceaka Wicked Panda

Cobalt GroupG0080 ↗

Has compromised legitimate web browser updates to deliver a backdoor. 1

created 2018-10-171 referenceaka GOLD KINGSWOOD

FIN7G0046 ↗

Has gained initial access by compromising a victim's software supply chain.1

created 2017-05-311 referenceaka GOLD NIAGARA

All 9 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview

Offense vs defense T1195.002

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 2Sigma rules (cumulative) · 17Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 8

first rule: 2023 Q1 · 2 of 2 campaigns plotted

Compromise Software Supply Chain detection strategy DET0309

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Compromised software/update chain (installer/write → first-run/child → egress/signature anomaly)

Enterprise

3 platforms

AN0862 · Windows

Adversary ships a tampered application or update: an updater/installer (msiexec/setup/update.exe/vendor service) writes or replaces binaries; on first run it spawns scripts/shells or unsigned DLLs and beacons to non-approved update CDNs/hosts. Detection correlates: (1) process creation of installer/updater → (2) file metadata changes in program paths → (3) first-run children and module/signature anomalies → (4) outbound connections to unexpected hosts within a short window.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Module LoadDC0016	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=7
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=1
File CreationDC0039	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=11
File MetadataDC0059	WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational	Unsigned or invalid image for newly installed/updated binaries
Windows Registry Key ModificationDC0063	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=13, 14
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	NSM:Flow	First-time egress to non-approved update hosts right after install/update
Driver LoadDC0079	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=6
Network Connection CreationDC0082	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=3, 22

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
TimeWindow	Correlate write→first-run→egress (default 90 minutes).
ApprovedUpdateHosts	Allow-list of vendor update endpoints, enterprise proxy/cache.
ApprovedSigners	Code-signing publishers allowed for programs/services.
ProgramPaths	Monitored install locations (e.g., C:\Program Files, C:\ProgramData, %LOCALAPPDATA%).

AN0863 · Linux

A compromised package/update (deb/rpm/tarball/AppImage/vendor updater) is installed, writing/overwriting files in /usr/local/bin, /usr/bin, /opt, or ~/.local; first run executes unexpected shells/curl/wget and connects to unapproved hosts. Correlate package/updater execution → file writes/replace → first-run child processes → egress.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	auditd:SYSCALL	execve
File MetadataDC0059	journald:package	dpkg/apt/yum/dnf transaction logs; vendor updaters in systemd journals
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	NSM:Flow	New outbound flows to non-approved vendor hosts post install

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
PathScope	Monitored install paths (/usr/local, /usr/bin, /opt/*, ~/.local/bin, /var/lib/systemd).
ApprovedRepos	Allow-listed APT/YUM repos and GPG keys for vendor updates.
TimeWindow	Default 90 minutes.

AN0864 · macOS

A tampered app/pkg/notarized update is installed via installer, softwareupdated, Homebrew, or vendor updater; new Mach-O or bundle contents appear in /Applications, /Library, /usr/local or /opt/homebrew; first run spawns sh/zsh/osascript/curl and makes egress to unfamiliar domains; AMFI/Gatekeeper may log signature/notarization problems.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	macos:endpointsecurity	exec
File MetadataDC0059	macos:unifiedlog	pkginstalld/softwareupdated/Homebrew install transactions
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	NSM:Flow	New/rare egress to non-approved update hosts after install

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
AllowedTeamIDs	Apple Developer Team IDs allowed for enterprise.
BrewTapsAllowList	Trusted Homebrew taps.
TimeWindow	Default 90 minutes.

Tests1Executorsbash 1Need elevation0 of 1Have prerequisites1Have cleanup0Platformscontainers, linux

Test

Platform

Executor

Elevation

Prereqs

Cleanup

Ref

Simulate npm package installation on a Linux system

containers, linux

bash

—

Launches a short‑lived Kubernetes pod using the Node 18 image, initializes a minimal npm project in /tmp/test, and installs the specified npm package without audit/fund/package‑lock options, simulating potentially suspicious package retrieval (e.g., typosquatting/dependency confusion) from within a container. The pod is deleted after execution.

Input arguments

Name	Type	Default	Description
pod_name	string	atomic-npm-install	Name of the pod
image_name	string	node:18	Name of the image
package_name	string	tinycolor	NPM package to install

Attack command

kubectl run #{pod_name} --image=#{image_name} --restart=Never --attach --rm -i -- bash -lc "mkdir -p /tmp/test && cd /tmp/test && npm init -y >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo '--- package.json before install ---' && cat package.json && npm install #{package_name} --no-audit --no-fund --no-package-lock && echo '--- package.json after install ---' && cat package.json"

Prerequisite

kubectl must be installed and configured

Check

which kubectl

Satisfy

echo "kubectl must be installed"

GUIDbacd54c7-1921-49de-9b73-f1e5c3c180ad

Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition

Compromise Software Supply Chain detections T1195.002

25 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

Top 11%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

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