Has used TCP port 1224 for C2.1
Non-Standard Port T1571
- Tactic
- Command and Control
- Platforms
- ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows
- Version
- 1.3
- Created
- 14 March 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088[1] or port 587[2] as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Non-Standard Port MITRE reference T1571
17 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has used random high number ports for PlugX listeners on victim devices.1
Has used non-standard ports such as TCP 8080 for HTTP communication.1
Has used various non-standard ports for C2 communication.1
Used ports 5190 and 7900 for shellcode listeners, and 4444, 4445, 31337 for shellcode C2.1
All 17 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
8 campaigns have been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries had created a Reverse SOCKS Proxy and communicated over the non-standard port 8008.12
During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used a backdoor that binds to port 45678 by default.1
Has used non-standard TCP ports – such as 7777, 11288, 63256, 63210, 3256, and 3556 for C2.12
Generates a random port number greater than 30,000 to serve as the listener for subsequent command and control activity.1
During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892, to establish RDP connections.1
During Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions, RedEcho used non-standard ports such as TCP 8080 for HTTP communication.1
All 8 campaigns for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
41 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Has the ability to bind on a localhost and listen on port 8300.12
HiddenFace's passive mode listens on TCP 47000.12
Has distributed C2 using BitTorrent’s Distributed Hash Table (DHT) network to harness a decentralized command capability.1
The server component of SystemBC has used various TCP ports for C2 communication.1
Has communicated with C2 IP addresses over ports 1224 or 1244.123
Has been observed utilizing HTTP communications to the C2 server over ports 1224, 2245 and 8637.1
All 41 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1571
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Non-Standard Port detection strategy DET0227
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Non-Standard Ports
AN0633 · Windows
Processes initiating outbound connections on uncommon ports or using protocols inconsistent with the assigned port. Correlating process creation with subsequent network connections reveals anomalies such as svchost.exe or Office applications using high, atypical ports.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| Network Connection CreationDC0082 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=5156, 5157 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| PortThresholds | Define what constitutes a 'non-standard port' based on organizational baselines (e.g., allow 443/80/22 but flag 8088/587/3389 changes). |
| ProcessAllowList | Processes normally allowed to use non-standard ports (e.g., custom apps). |
| TimeWindow | Correlate process creation and network activity within N seconds. |
AN0634 · Linux
Unusual daemons or user processes binding/listening on ports outside of standard ranges, or initiating client connections using mismatched protocol/port pairings.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | linux:osquery | process listening or connecting on non-standard ports |
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | linux:syslog | processes binding to non-standard ports or sshd configured on unexpected port |
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | auditd:SYSCALL | socket/connect syscalls |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| AllowedServices | Exclude ports intentionally configured for enterprise apps. |
| PayloadEntropyThreshold | Define thresholds for anomalous payload entropy to catch tunneled traffic. |
AN0635 · macOS
Applications making outbound connections on non-standard ports or launchd services bound to ports inconsistent with system baselines.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | macos:unifiedlog | launchd services binding to non-standard ports |
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | macos:unifiedlog | outbound TCP/UDP traffic over unexpected port |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| BaselinePortProfiles | Define expected macOS service port usage (e.g., AirDrop, Bonjour). |
AN0636 · ESXi
VM services or management daemons communicating on ports not defined by VMware defaults, such as vpxa or hostd processes initiating traffic over high-numbered or unexpected ports.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | esxi:vpxd | ESXi service connections on unexpected ports |
| Network Traffic ContentDC0085 | esxcli:network | listening sockets bound to non-standard ports |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| ESXiAllowedPorts | Default VMware service ports that should not be flagged. |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.
Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports for that particular network segment.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition