John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center; Mohit Rathore
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code.
Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain authenticated access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.[1][2] Another example of this is replay attacks, in which the adversary intercepts data packets sent between parties and then later replays these packets. If services don't properly validate authentication requests, these replayed packets may allow an adversary to impersonate one of the parties and gain unauthorized access or privileges.[3][4][5]
Such exploitation has been demonstrated in cloud environments as well. For example, adversaries have exploited vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure that allowed for unintended authentication token creation and renewal.[6]
Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.
Threat groups45th percentile · 55% of ATT&CK techniques have more threat groups attributed.
1
Campaigns72nd pct
Campaigns72nd percentile · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have fewer campaigns recorded.
0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.
9
Detection rules73rd pct
Detection rules73rd percentile · 71% of ATT&CK techniques have fewer detection rules written.
Exploitation for Credential Access MITRE reference T1212
45th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Exploitation for Credential Access detection strategy DET0174
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Exploitation for Credential Access
Enterprise
4 platforms
AN0493 · Windows
Detects adversary exploitation of authentication mechanisms or credential validation processes. Defender perspective includes forged Kerberos tickets (e.g., MS14-068), abnormal LSASS memory access, replayed authentication attempts, and unexpected crashes of authentication services. Multi-event correlation ties exploitation attempts to abnormal process creation, service instability, and suspicious authentication events.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
MonitoredAccounts
High-value accounts (e.g., Domain Admins) for anomalous ticket issuance or replay activity.
ReplayDetectionWindow
Time window for correlating duplicate or replayed Kerberos authentications.
AN0494 · Linux
Detects exploitation of authentication daemons or PAM modules. Defender perspective includes failed or anomalous PAM authentications, abnormal segfaults in authentication services, and exploitation attempts followed by successful unauthorized logins. Correlation identifies memory corruption, replay attempts, and privilege escalation tied to credential services.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
execve: Suspicious binaries or scripts interacting with authentication binaries (sshd, gdm, login)
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
AuthServiceList
List of monitored authentication services (e.g., sshd, gdm, PAM modules).
FailureThreshold
Number of failed authentications within a window before escalating to replay suspicion.
AN0495 · macOS
Detects exploitation attempts against macOS authentication frameworks such as OpenDirectory or Keychain. Defender perspective includes abnormal crashes in opendirectoryd, unauthorized Keychain API usage, and unusual sudo or login events. Correlation links unexpected process behavior with credential access anomalies.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
opendirectoryd crashes or abnormal authentication errors
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
WatchedAPIs
List of authentication and Keychain-related APIs to monitor for unauthorized access.
CrashCorrelationWindow
Time window for correlating authentication service crashes with subsequent suspicious access.
AN0496 · Identity Provider
Detects exploitation of vulnerabilities in cloud identity providers (IdPs) such as Azure AD or Okta for credential access. Defender perspective includes anomalous token creation or renewal, authentication bypass events, and API abuse to mint unauthorized tokens. Correlation highlights exploitation attempts tied to absent or inconsistent audit logs.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
Application developers should consider taking measures to validate authentication requests by enabling one-time passwords, providing timestamps or sequence numbers for messages sent, using digital signatures, and/or using random session keys.
Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. Risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in these systems may still exist.
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.
Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization.