ShinyHuntersG1057 ↗
Has sent phishing emails to Microsoft Office 365 corporate users in order to steal credentials.1
tfMITRE ATT&CK technique
Phishing for Information T1598
- Tactic
- Reconnaissance
- Platform
- PRE
- Version
- 1.4
- Created
- 02 October 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributors
- Philip Winther; Sebastian Salla, McAfee; Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos; Ohad Zaidenberg, @ohad_mz; Liora Itkin; Liran Ravich, CardinalOps; Scott Cook, Capital One
Sub-techniques 43 rules across the family · 1 mapped directly to T1598 · 1 of 4 carry rules
Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from Phishing in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code.
ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact
6
Threat groupsTop 25%
Threat groups75th percentile · 75% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.0
CampaignsNone recorded
CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.1
Detection rules42nd pct
Detection rules42nd percentile · 58% of ATT&CK techniques have more detection rules written.Phishing for Information MITRE reference T1598
Top 25%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
6 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Moonstone SleetG1036 ↗
Has interacted with victims to gather information via email.1
Scattered SpiderG1015 ↗
Has used a combination of credential phishing and social engineering to capture one-time-password (OTP) codes.1
ZIRCONIUMG0128 ↗
Targeted presidential campaign staffers with credential phishing e-mails.1
KimsukyG0094 ↗
Has used tailored spearphishing emails to gather victim information including contat lists to identify additional targets.1
APT28G0007 ↗
All 6 groups for this technique
Offense vs defense T1598
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Range
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 0Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 1
first rule: 2025 Q2Phishing for Information detection strategy DET0823
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Phishing for Information
1 platform
AN1955 · PRE
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). Monitor call logs from corporate devices to identify patterns of potential voice phishing, such as calls to/from known malicious phone numbers. Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | Application Log | None |
| Network Traffic FlowDC0078 | Network Traffic | None |
| Network Traffic ContentDC0085 | Network Traffic | None |
Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may enable recipients (intra-org and cross domain) to perform similar message filtering and validation.
User TrainingM1017
Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing attempts.