ShinyHunters has collected machine names and IP addresses by parsing the process scheduler configuration file psappsrv.cfg.9
group
ShinyHunters G1057
- Created
- 29 July 2026
- Last modified
- 31 July 2026
- Aliases
- ShinyHunters · UNC6240 · Bling Libra
ShinyHunters is a cyber criminal collective that has been active since at least 2019 operating under the ShinyCorp persona. ShinyHunters has targeted multiple industries and geographic regions gathering legitimate credentials and personally identifiable information (PII) for resale or extortion of victims. ShinyHunters has been associated with the broader collective called The Community, also known as The Com whose members have also included Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$. Public reporting has mentioned a variety of names for operations ShinyHunters members have reportedly conducted with members of other groups, including “Scattered Lapsus Hunters,” “Scattered Lapsus Shiny Hunters,” and “SLSH.”[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
MITRE reference G1057
ShinyHunters has enumerated the internal subnet using cat /etc/hosts | grep -E "[redacted_victim_string]".10
ShinyHunters has disguised MeshCentral agent binaries as Microsoft Azure services, e.g. meshagent32-azure-ops.exe, meshagent64-azure-ops.exe, and meshagent64-v2.exe.11
ShinyHunters has used the MeshCentral command-line interface utility meshctrl.js and npm to interact with compromised systems. Specifically for npm, ShinyHunters has checked for the authenticode tool using the command npm list global authenticode.12 Additionally, ShinyHunters has used the MeshCentral command to execute the propagation script: node meshctrl.js RunCommand --loginuser admin --loginpass '[password]' --id '[agent_id]' --run 'bash /tmp/[victim_abbreviation]_fanout.sh' .12
ShinyHunters has used the AWS Command Line Interface (CLI) for operations to include a variety of API calls, such as ListBuckets, CreateBucket and DeleteBucket.14
ShinyHunters has executed API calls to enumerate permissions for compromised AWS accounts.15
Standing G1057
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this group touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 176 ATT&CK groups only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
82nd percentile · 82% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
94th percentile · 94% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many tactics spanned or fewer.
23rd percentile · 77% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tools and malware.
89% of the population shares a single value across only 4 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
15th percentile · 85% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more detection rules per technique.
Detection coverage G1057
1032 distinct rules cover the 46 techniques recorded for this group. The 1137 technique-to-rule mappings resolve to 1032 distinct rules, because one rule can cover several techniques. 623 Sigma · 409 Splunk.
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