tfMITRE ATT&CK technique

Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059

Tactic: Execution
Platforms: Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows
Version: 2.7
Created: 31 May 2017
Last modified: 12 May 2026

Sub-techniques 13588 rules across the family · 144 mapped directly to T1059 · 10 of 13 carry rules

.001PowerShell297 .002AppleScript10 .003Windows Command Shell61 .004Unix Shell30 .005Visual Basic36 .006Python14 .007JavaScript34 .008Network Device CLI0 .009Cloud API4 .010AutoHotKey & AutoIT0 .011Lua0 .012Hypervisor CLI9 .013Container CLI/API1

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsTop 11%

Threat groups89th percentile · 89% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.

CampaignsTop 10%

Campaigns90th percentile · 90% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.

Tools & malwareTop 15%

Tools & malware85th percentile · 85% of ATT&CK techniques have this many tools implementing them or fewer.

144

Detection rulesTop 1%

Detection rules99th percentile · 99% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

Command and Scripting Interpreter MITRE reference T1059

Top 11%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups

17 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.

Winter VivernG1035 ↗

Used XLM 4.0 macros for initial code execution for malicious document files.1

created 2024-07-291 referenceaka TA473

Saint BearG1031 ↗

Has used the Windows Script Host (wscript) to execute intermediate files written to victim machines.1

created 2024-05-251 referenceaka Storm-0587

Mustang PandaG0129 ↗

Has utilized meterpreter shellcode.1

created 2021-04-121 referenceaka TA416

WindigoG0124 ↗

Has used a Perl script for information gathering.1

created 2021-02-101 reference

Fox KittenG0117 ↗

Has used a Perl reverse shell to communicate with C2.1

created 2020-12-211 referenceaka UNC757

WhiteflyG0107 ↗

Has used a simple remote shell tool that will call back to the C2 server and wait for commands.1

created 2020-05-261 reference

All 17 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview

Offense vs defense T1059

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 4Sigma rules (cumulative) · 97Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 47

first rule: 2017 Q2 · 4 of 4 campaigns plotted

Command and Scripting Interpreter detection strategy DET0516

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 5 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Behavioral Detection of Command and Scripting Interpreter Abuse

Enterprise

5 platforms

AN1428 · Windows

Detects the execution of scripting or command interpreters (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe) outside expected administrative time windows or from abnormal user contexts, often followed by encoded/obfuscated arguments or secondary execution events.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=1

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
CommandLinePattern	Tunable to match encoded or uncommon script execution patterns specific to the environment.
ParentProcessName	May vary across managed/unmanaged workstations or user-driven script activity.
TimeWindow	Used to restrict analysis to work hours or known admin maintenance windows.

AN1429 · Linux

Detects use of shell interpreters (e.g., bash, sh, python, perl) initiated by users or processes not normally executing them, especially when chaining suspicious utilities like netcat, curl, or ssh.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	auditd:SYSCALL	execve

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
InterpreterName	Regex to identify which interpreters (bash, python, ruby) to monitor based on typical usage.
UserContext	Scope to users or service accounts not expected to run interpreters interactively.
ExecutionChainLength	Defines maximum process tree depth to correlate interpreter execution with its effects.

AN1430 · macOS

Detects launch of command-line interpreters via Terminal, Automator, or hidden osascript, especially when parent process lineage deviates from user-initiated applications.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	macos:unifiedlog	log stream --info --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "exec"'

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
LaunchAgentName	Monitor for specific plist agents frequently abused for persistence or payload execution.
ScriptName	Path or script name pattern (e.g., hidden files, /tmp locations).
TerminalAppUsage	Adjust based on whether Terminal.app use is common or restricted in user policy.

AN1431 · ESXi

Detects use of 'esxcli system' or direct interpreter commands (e.g., busybox shell) invoked from SSH or host terminal unexpectedly.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Command ExecutionDC0064	esxi:vobd	shell session start

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
ShellEnabledFlag	Control alerting based on whether ESXi shell access is typically disabled.
SSHContext	Scope detection to SSH session origins or internal vs. remote access.

AN1432 · Network Devices

Identifies CLI interpreter access (e.g., Cisco IOS, Juniper JUNOS) via enable mode or scripting-capable sessions used by uncommon accounts or from unknown IPs.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
User Account AuthenticationDC0002	networkdevice:syslog	authentication & authorization
Command ExecutionDC0064	networkdevice:cli	shell command

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
UserRole	Which roles or privilege levels should be monitored for interpreter misuse.
DeviceType	Support filtering for routers, switches, firewalls depending on network segmentation.

1 analytic

Often, after a threat actor gains access to a system, they will attempt to run some kind of malware to further infect the victim machine. These malware often have long command line strings, which could be a possible indicator of attack. Here, we use sysmon and Splunk to first find the average command string length and search for command strings that stretch over multiple lines, thus identifying anomalies and possibly malicious commands.

TypeAnomalyCoverageLowSubmitted2020

D3FEND techniques

The defensive countermeasure this analytic implements, in MITRE’s D3FEND ontology.

ID	Name
D3-PSA	Process Spawn Analysis

Data model references

The CAR data model objects, actions and fields the logic reads. Map these to your own schema before implementing.

Object	Action	Field
process	create	command_line

Implementations

Pseudocode is the canonical logic; the rest are CAR’s translations into vendor query languages.

This is a Splunk query that determines the average length of a command per user and searches for a command string that is multiple times longer than the average length

index=* sourcetype="xmlwineventlog" EventCode=4688  |eval cmd_len=len(CommandLine) | eventstats avg(cmd_len) as avg by host| stats max(cmd_len) as maxlen, values(avg) as avgperhost by host, CommandLine | where maxlen > 10*avgperhost

Antivirus/AntimalwareM1049

Anti-virus can be used to automatically quarantine suspicious files.

AuditM1047

Inventory systems for unauthorized command and scripting interpreter installations.

Behavior Prevention on EndpointM1040

On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Visual Basic and JavaScript scripts from executing potentially malicious downloaded content .

Code SigningM1045

Where possible, only permit execution of signed scripts.

Disable or Remove Feature or ProgramM1042

Disable or remove any unnecessary or unused shells or interpreters.

Execution PreventionM1038

Use application control where appropriate. For example, PowerShell Constrained Language mode can be used to restrict access to sensitive or otherwise dangerous language elements such as those used to execute arbitrary Windows APIs or files (e.g., Add-Type).

Limit Software InstallationM1033

Prevent user installation of unrequired command and scripting interpreters.

Privileged Account ManagementM1026

When PowerShell is necessary, consider restricting PowerShell execution policy to administrators. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. PowerShell JEA (Just Enough Administration) may also be used to sandbox administration and limit what commands admins/users can execute through remote PowerShell sessions.

Restrict Web-Based ContentM1021

Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of scripts and HTA files that may commonly be used during the exploitation process. For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place.

Tests1ExecutorsPowerShell 1Need elevation0 of 1Have prerequisites1Have cleanup0Platformswindows

Test

Platform

Executor

Elevation

Prereqs

Cleanup

Ref

AutoIt Script Execution

windows

PowerShell

—

An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.

Input arguments

Name	Type	Default	Description
autoit_path	path	C:\Program Files (x86)\AutoIt3\AutoIt3.exe	AutoIt Executable File Path
script_path	path	PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059\src\calc.au3	AutoIt Script Path

Attack command

Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"

Prerequisite

AutoIt executable file must exist on disk at the specified location (#{autoit_path})

Check

if(Test-Path "#{autoit_path}") {
    exit 0
} else {
    exit 1
}

Satisfy

New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
$AutoItURL = "https://www.autoitscript.com/cgi-bin/getfile.pl?autoit3/autoit-v3-setup.exe"
$InstallerPath = "$PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\autoit-v3-setup.exe"
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $AutoItURL -OutFile $InstallerPath
Start-Process -FilePath $InstallerPath -ArgumentList "/S" -Wait

GUID48410cb3-9b8b-4d53-9fc0-83814f2a75a6

Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition

Command and Scripting Interpreter detections T1059

144 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

Top 1%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

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