Sandworm TeamG0034 ↗
Conducted technical reconnaissance of the Parliament of Georgia's official internet domain prior to its 2019 attack.1
tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique
Domain Properties T1590.001
sub-technique of T1590 Gather Victim Network Information
- Tactic
- Reconnaissance
- Platform
- PRE
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 02 October 2020
- Last modified
- 24 October 2025
- Contributor
- Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers.
ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact
1
Threat groups45th pct
Threat groups45th percentile · 55% of ATT&CK techniques have more threat groups attributed.0
CampaignsNone recorded
CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.1
Tools & malware44th pct
Tools & malware44th percentile · 56% of ATT&CK techniques have more tools implementing them.2
Detection rules50th pct
Detection rules50th percentile · 50% of ATT&CK techniques have more detection rules written.Domain Properties MITRE reference T1590.001
45th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
All 1 groups for this technique
Offense vs defense T1590.001
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Range
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 1Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 1
first rule: 2023 Q2Domain Properties detection strategy DET0847
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Domain Properties
1 platform
AN1979 · PRE
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Pre-compromiseM1056
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties.