Initial execution included launching multiple svchost processes and injecting code into them.1
Process Injection T1055
- Tactics
- Privilege Escalation, Stealth
- Platforms
- Linux, macOS, Windows
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 31 May 2017
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributors
- Anastasios Pingios; Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek; Ryan Becwar
Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Process Injection MITRE reference T1055
15 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has injected Cobalt Strike into wuauclt.exe during intrusions.1 BlackByte has injected ransomware into svchost.exe before encryption.2
Has used the CLEANPULSE utility to insert command line strings into a targeted process to alter its functionality.1
Has injected malicious code into legitimate .NET related processes including regsvcs.exe, msbuild.exe, and installutil.exe.12
Has used process injection to execute payloads to escalate privileges.1
Malware TIDYELF loaded the main WINTERLOVE component by injecting it into the iexplore.exe process.1
All 15 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
7 campaigns have been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
During RedPenguin, UNC3886 exploited CVE-2025-21590 to enable malicious code injection into the memory of legitimate processes.12
During Cutting Edge, threat actors used malicious SparkGateway plugins to inject shared objects into web process memory on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs to enable deployment of backdoors.1
Included injecting code into the AAA and Crash Dump processes on infected Cisco ASA devices.1
During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus's VEILEDSIGNAL uses process injection to inject the C2 communication module code in the first found process instance of Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. It also monitors the established named pipe and re-injects the C2 communication module if necessary.1
During Operation Wocao, threat actors injected code into a selected process, which in turn launches a command as a child process of the original.1
During Operation Sharpshooter, threat actors leveraged embedded shellcode to inject a downloader into the memory of Word.1
All 7 campaigns for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
65 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can inject decrypted payloads into processes including wuauclt.exe., rdrleakdiag.exe, and tabcal.exe.1
Can inject code directly into legitimate applications.1
Can inject shellcode directly into process memory including WINWORD.exe and msiexec.exe.1
Can inject shellcode into the memory of compromised hosts.123
Can inject its final stage into another process on the targeted system.1
Injects into a newly-created svchost.exe process prior to device encryption.1
All 65 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1055
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Process Injection detection strategy DET0508
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Behavioral Detection of Process Injection Across Platforms
AN1399 · Windows
Detects process injection by correlating memory manipulation API calls (e.g., VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory), suspicious thread creation (e.g., CreateRemoteThread), and unusual DLL loads within another process's context.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Module LoadDC0016 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=7 |
| OS API ExecutionDC0021 | etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process | API calls |
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| Process AccessDC0035 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=10 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| AccessMask | Specific access rights used during process handle acquisition, e.g., PROCESS_VM_WRITE |
| TimeWindow | Time correlation window between API calls and thread creation events |
| InjectedProcessList | Known high-value targets often abused for injection (e.g., lsass.exe, explorer.exe) |
AN1400 · Linux
Detects ptrace- or memfd-based process injection through audit logs capturing system calls (e.g., ptrace, mmap) targeting running processes along with suspicious file descriptors or memory writes.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process ModificationDC0020 | linux:procfs | /proc/[pid]/maps, /proc/[pid]/mem |
| OS API ExecutionDC0021 | auditd:SYSCALL | ptrace, mmap, process_vm_writev |
| File AccessDC0055 | auditd:SYSCALL | open |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TargetPIDThreshold | Limit to sensitive or unexpected processes being targeted (e.g., sshd, init) |
| TimeWindow | Correlate mmap or writev usage to process access within a short timeframe |
AN1401 · macOS
Detects memory-based injection by monitoring task_for_pid, mach_vm_write, and dylib injection patterns through DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES or manual memory mapping.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Module LoadDC0016 | macos:syslog | DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES anomalies |
| Process MetadataDC0034 | macos:endpointsecurity | ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC, ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_MMAP |
| Process AccessDC0035 | macos:unifiedlog | subsystem=com.apple.security, library=libsystem_kernel.dylib |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TargetProcessSignature | Expected signing identity or origin of process being injected |
| MachSyscallContext | Observed syscall combinations (e.g., task_for_pid followed by vm_write) |
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. For example, on Windows 10, Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules may prevent Office applications from code injection.
Utilize Yama (ex: /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux, grsecurity, and AppArmor.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition