Has used Process Doppelgänging to evade security software while deploying tools on compromised systems.1
- Tactics
- Privilege Escalation, Stealth
- Platform
- Windows
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 14 January 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Process Doppelgänging MITRE reference T1055.013
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
All 1 groups for this technique
2 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can inject into a target process using process doppelgänging.12
Abuses NTFS transactions to launch and conceal malicious processes.12
All 2 software entries for this technique
Offense vs defense T1055.013
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Process Doppelgänging detection strategy DET0544
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Process Doppelgänging on Windows
AN1501 · Windows
Detects adversary abuse of Transactional NTFS (TxF) and undocumented process loading mechanisms (e.g., NtCreateProcessEx) to create a hollowed process from an uncommitted, maliciously tainted file image in memory, later executed via NtCreateThreadEx.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| OS API ExecutionDC0021 | etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process | CreateTransaction, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, NtCreateProcessEx, NtCreateThreadEx |
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| Process AccessDC0035 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=10 |
| File CreationDC0039 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TransactionExecutableNamePattern | Pattern of legitimate executables often used as doppelgänging targets (e.g., svchost.exe, calc.exe) |
| TimeWindow_TransactionToExecution | Time delta between TxF rollback and thread creation in hollowed process |
| ThreadStartEntropyThreshold | Entropy level of thread start address in memory used to detect obfuscated shellcode |
| TxF API Call Frequency Threshold | Limit on CreateTransaction + RollbackTransaction sequences per process |
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process.