Can hide services used to aid execution.1
Hide Artifacts T1564
- Tactic
- Stealth
- Platforms
- ESXi, Linux, macOS, Office Suite, Windows
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 26 February 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.[1][2][3]
Hide Artifacts MITRE reference T1564
7 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Has used %HiddenReg% and %HiddenKey% as part of its persistence via the Windows registry.1
Is able to create “hidden” scheduled tasks by deleting the Security Descriptor (SD) registry value.1
Can masquerade the Process Environment Block on a compromised host to hide its attempts to elevate privileges through IFileOperation.1
Uses the mktemp utility to make unique file and directory names for payloads, such as TMP_DIR=`mktemp -d -t x.1
Has used the mktemp utility to make random and unique filenames for payloads, such as export tmpDir="$(mktemp -d /tmp/XXXXXXXXXXXX)" or mktemp -t Installer.123
All 7 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1564
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Hide Artifacts detection strategy DET0502
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 5 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Hidden Artifacts Across Platforms
AN1384 · Windows
Abuse of file/registry attributes to hide malicious files, directories, or services. Defender view: detection of attrib.exe setting hidden/system flags, creation of Alternate Data Streams, or registry keys altering file visibility.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 |
| File CreationDC0039 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 |
| Windows Registry Key ModificationDC0063 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=13, 14 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| FileExtensions | Filter for sensitive file types likely targeted for hiding. |
| ADSDetection | Enable or disable detection of Alternate Data Streams depending on business use. |
AN1385 · Linux
Hidden file creation using leading '.' or file attribute changes with chattr (immutable/hidden flags). Defender view: detect execution of chattr, lsattr anomalies, and unusual hidden files appearing in system directories.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| File CreationDC0039 | auditd:FILE | Creation of hidden files (.*) in sensitive directories (/etc, /var, /usr/bin) |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | auditd:EXECVE | Execution of chattr to set +i or +a attributes |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| DirectoryScope | Restrict hidden file detection to privileged system directories. |
| AttributeFlags | Tune for specific chattr flags (+i immutable, +a append-only) most abused for persistence. |
AN1386 · macOS
Hidden files via 'chflags hidden' or Apple-specific attributes, LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons placed in non-standard hidden directories. Defender view: detect command execution modifying file flags and unusual plist creation in hidden paths.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| File CreationDC0039 | macos:unifiedlog | Creation of LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons in hidden or non-standard directories |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | macos:unifiedlog | Execution of chflags hidden or setfile -a V |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| HiddenDirectories | List of directories monitored for hidden plist or agent placement. |
AN1387 · ESXi
Abuse of VMFS or ESXi shell to hide datastore files, renaming/moving VMDK or VMX files into hidden directories. Defender view: anomalous ESXi shell commands or file operations obscuring VM artifacts.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| File MetadataDC0059 | esxi:syslog | Datastore file hidden or renamed unexpectedly |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | esxi:shell | mv, rename, or chmod commands moving VM files into hidden directories |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| VMFileScope | Restrict to VMDK, VMX, or log files critical for VM operations. |
AN1388 · Office Suite
Malicious macros or embedded objects hidden within Office documents by renaming streams or using hidden OLE objects. Defender view: detection of hidden macro streams or objects in documents correlated with anomalous execution.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | m365:unified | Detection of hidden macro streams or SetHiddenAttribute actions |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| MacroScope | Tune detection to specific Office apps and document types where macros are disallowed. |
Review and audit file/folder exclusions, and limit scope of exclusions to only what is required where possible.
Application developers should consider limiting the requirements for custom or otherwise difficult to manage file/folder exclusions. Where possible, install applications to trusted system folder paths that are already protected by restricted file and directory permissions.
Periodically audit virtual machines for abnormalities.
Restrict the installation of software that may be abused to create hidden desktops, such as hVNC, to user groups that require it.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition