Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.[1][2][3]
Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.[4]
71st pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of tools
7 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Has used the mktemp utility to make random and unique filenames for payloads, such as export tmpDir="$(mktemp -d /tmp/XXXXXXXXXXXX)" or mktemp -t Installer.123
created 2019-08-29MALWARE
All 7 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1564
Compare defenses against adversary use. Eight counts, ranking this technique against the entire ATT&CK Enterprise matrix. Attack sits left, defense right.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 5 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Hidden Artifacts Across Platforms
Enterprise
5 platforms
AN1384 · Windows
Abuse of file/registry attributes to hide malicious files, directories, or services. Defender view: detection of attrib.exe setting hidden/system flags, creation of Alternate Data Streams, or registry keys altering file visibility.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
FileExtensions
Filter for sensitive file types likely targeted for hiding.
ADSDetection
Enable or disable detection of Alternate Data Streams depending on business use.
AN1385 · Linux
Hidden file creation using leading '.' or file attribute changes with chattr (immutable/hidden flags). Defender view: detect execution of chattr, lsattr anomalies, and unusual hidden files appearing in system directories.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
HiddenDirectories
List of directories monitored for hidden plist or agent placement.
AN1387 · ESXi
Abuse of VMFS or ESXi shell to hide datastore files, renaming/moving VMDK or VMX files into hidden directories. Defender view: anomalous ESXi shell commands or file operations obscuring VM artifacts.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
mv, rename, or chmod commands moving VM files into hidden directories
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
VMFileScope
Restrict to VMDK, VMX, or log files critical for VM operations.
AN1388 · Office Suite
Malicious macros or embedded objects hidden within Office documents by renaming streams or using hidden OLE objects. Defender view: detection of hidden macro streams or objects in documents correlated with anomalous execution.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
Application developers should consider limiting the requirements for custom or otherwise difficult to manage file/folder exclusions. Where possible, install applications to trusted system folder paths that are already protected by restricted file and directory permissions.
Restrict the installation of software that may be abused to create hidden desktops, such as hVNC, to user groups that require it.
Tests5Executorspowershell 3 · command_prompt 2Need elevation3 of 5Have prerequisites2Have cleanup5Platformswindows
#
Test
Platform
Executor
Elevation
Prereqs
Cleanup
Ref
01
Extract binary files via VBA
windows
powershell
—
1
Yes
This module extracts a binary (calc.exe) from inside of another binary.
In the wild maldoc authors will use this technique to hide binaries inside of files stored
within the office document itself. An example of this technique can be seen in sample
f986040c7dd75b012e7dfd876acb33a158abf651033563ab068800f07f508226
This sample contains a document inside of itself. Document 1 is the actual maldoc itself, document 2
is the same document without all the malicious code. Document 1 will copy Document 2 to the file system
and then "peek" inside of this document and pull out the oleObject.bin file. Contained inside of this
oleObject.bin file is a payload that is parsed out and executed on the file system.
The following technique utilizes sc.exe and sdset to change the security descriptor of a service and "hide" it from Get-Service or sc query.
Upon successful execution, sc.exe creates a new service changes the security descriptor.
https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-string-format
Inputs
Name
Description
Type
Default Value
service_name
Name of service to create
string
AtomicService
executable_command
Command to execute as a service
string
C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
Attack Commandsrun with command_promptelevation required (root or admin)
NirCmd is used by threat actors to execute commands, which can include recon and privilege escalation via running commands via the SYSTEM account
See https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/black-basta-technical-analysis
Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a parent process located in the "\Users\Public" folder executing a child process containing references to shell or scripting binaries and commandlines.