Has used a resource fork to hide a compressed binary file of itself from the terminal, Finder, and potentially evade traditional scanners.12
- Tactic
- Stealth
- Platform
- macOS
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 12 October 2021
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributors
- Ivan Sinyakov; Jaron Bradley @jbradley89
Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.[1] Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.[2][3]
Resource Forking MITRE reference T1564.009
2 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Uses a resource fork to present a macOS JPEG or text file icon rather than the executable's icon assigned by the operating system.1
All 2 software entries for this technique
Offense vs defense T1564.009
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
Resource Forking detection strategy DET0584
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Resource Forking on macOS
AN1609 · macOS
Unexpected creation or modification of files with com.apple.ResourceFork extended attributes containing unusually large or non-standard data. Defender perspective: detection of resource forks in contexts where they are uncommon, especially when paired with process execution or network activity.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | macos:unifiedlog | Process creation involving binaries interacting with resource fork data |
| File MetadataDC0059 | macos:unifiedlog | File creation or modification with com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | macos:unifiedlog | Execution of commands like `ls -l@`, `xattr -l`, or custom tools interacting with resource forks |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| ResourceForkSizeThreshold | Adjust thresholds for 'unusually large' resource fork data based on baseline usage in the environment. |
| MonitoredDirectories | Scope monitoring to sensitive directories such as /Users, /Applications, or temporary paths. |
| CorrelatedActivityWindow | Time window for correlating resource fork activity with subsequent execution or network activity. |
Configure applications to use the application bundle structure which leverages the /Resources folder location.