POLLBLEND is a Windows tunneler written C++ that has utilized hardcoded C2 servers and leveraged hardcoded URI parameters for follow-on actions.[1]POLLBLEND was first observed in 2025 and has been affiliated with the cyber espionage threat group NIMBUS MANTICORE.[1]
5
TechniquesBottom 23%
5
Tactics41st pct
1
Threat groupunranked
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
POLLBLEND has exfiltrated the victim device’s username and computer name within the JSON body through HTTP POST requests to the URI pathway /register/.3
POLLBLEND has been executed using DLL search order hijacking.7
Execution · Stealth112 detection rules
Standing S9066
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 842 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques5Bottom 23%
23rd percentile · 77% of 842 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics541st pct
41st percentile · 59% of 842 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat group162% tie · 22 values
62% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns086% tie · 8 values
86% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique60medTop 3%
97th percentile · 97% of 842 ATT&CK software entries have this many detection rules per technique or fewer.
Tests / technique3medBottom 16%
16th percentile · 84% of 842 ATT&CK software entries have more atomic tests per technique.
Data comps / technique5med53% tie · 11 values
53% of the population shares a single value across only 11 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Mitigations / technique2medTop 8%
92nd percentile · 92% of 842 ATT&CK software entries have this many mitigations per technique or fewer.
5 of 8 axes carry an honest rank on this page. Coverage medians are taken across this malware’s 5 Enterprise techniques.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
Detects the Linux-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency by Axios NPM package, including payload download via curl and detached execution using nohup and python3. (...)
Detects the macOS-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency in Axios NPM Package, including AppleScript execution via osascript, payload download, permission modification, execution, and cleanup.
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. (...)
This analytic detects the usage of the Utility osascript on a macOS device initiated a network connection lasting longer than 10 minutes (600 seconds). (...)
This analytic detects unexpected outbound network connections initiated by known webserver processes such as `httpd.exe`, `nginx.exe`, or `tomcat.exe` to common file sharing or public content hosting services like GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of known suspicious SSL certificates in any observed event where the SSL_CertFingerprint field is present. (...)
The following analytic detects potential reverse shell activity by identifying connections involving ports commonly associated with remote access tools, shell listeners, or tunneling utilities. (...)
The following analytic detects connections with a high Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) threat confidence score, indicating potentially malicious behavior within encrypted traffic. (...)
The following analytic detects potentially suspicious large volumes of data sent by the connection initiator on flows from internal to external networks. (...)
This analytic identifies Snort intrusion signatures that have been triggered by ten or more distinct internal IP addresses within a one-hour window. (...)
Detects creation of specific system DLL files that are usually not present on the system (or at least not in system directories) but may be loaded by legitimate processes. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of the curl utility where the command line includes percent-encoded characters and explicit file output options (such as -o or --output). (...)