tfMITRE ATT&CK technique

Archive Collected Data T1560

Tactic: Collection
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Version: 1.0
Created: 20 February 2020
Last modified: 12 May 2026

Sub-techniques 329 rules across the family · 7 mapped directly to T1560 · 1 of 3 carry rules

.001Archive via Utility24 .002Archive via Library0 .003Archive via Custom Method0

An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.[1] Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsTop 14%

Threat groups86th percentile · 86% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malwareTop 9%

Tools & malware91st percentile · 91% of ATT&CK techniques have this many tools implementing them or fewer.

Detection rules69th pct

Detection rules69th percentile · 69% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

Archive Collected Data MITRE reference T1560

Top 14%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups

13 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.

BlackByteG1043 ↗

Compressed data collected from victim environments prior to exfiltration.1

created 2024-12-161 referenceaka Hecamede

LuminousMothG1014 ↗

Has manually archived stolen files from victim machines before exfiltration.1

created 2023-02-231 reference

Ember BearG1003 ↗

Has compressed collected data prior to exfiltration.1

created 2022-06-091 referenceaka UNC2589

LeviathanG0065 ↗

Has archived victim's data prior to exfiltration.1

created 2018-04-181 referenceaka MUDCARP

APT32G0050 ↗

APT32's backdoor has used LZMA compression and RC4 encryption before exfiltration.1

created 2017-12-141 referenceaka SeaLotus

menuPassG0045 ↗

Has encrypted files and information before exfiltration.1 2

created 2017-05-312 referencesaka Cicada

All 13 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview

44 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.

Mini Shai-HuludS9043 ↗

Has compressed collected credentials to reduce transmission size and to make string content harder to detect in memory forensics captures.1

created 2026-07-29MALWAREcarried by 1 group

LP-NotesS9036 ↗

Has encrypted collected credentials using AES-CBC from the CNG API and the key ED15C8344B45DAED1E0578F8BC1A32411812C61F4CB45D89B107287DE0E09FFC and the initialization vector 91A4E6F6D51DAEE773A8F00279792578.1

created 2026-04-21MALWAREcarried by 1 group

MuddyViperS9032 ↗

Has archived collected web browser data into a file named CacheDump.zip.1       

created 2026-04-20MALWAREcarried by 1 group

JumbledPathS1206 ↗

Can compress and encrypt exfiltrated packet captures from targeted devices.1

created 2025-02-25MALWAREcarried by 1 group

Troll StealerS1196 ↗

Compresses stolen data prior to exfiltration.1

created 2025-01-17MALWAREcarried by 1 group

Raccoon StealerS1148 ↗

Archives collected system information in a text f ile, System info.txt, prior to exfiltration.1

created 2024-08-01MALWAREcarried by 1 group

All 44 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview

Offense vs defense T1560

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 4Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 3

first rule: 2019 Q4

Archive Collected Data detection strategy DET0526

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detect Archiving and Encryption of Collected Data (T1560)

Enterprise

3 platforms

AN1458 · Windows

Detects adversarial archiving of files prior to exfiltration by correlating execution of compression/encryption utilities (e.g., makecab.exe, rar.exe, 7z.exe, powershell Compress-Archive) with subsequent creation of large compressed or encrypted files. Identifies abnormal process lineage involving crypt32.dll usage, command-line arguments invoking compression switches, and file write operations to temporary or staging directories.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Module LoadDC0016	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=7
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=4688
File CreationDC0039	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=11

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
ArchiveExtensions	List of file extensions treated as suspicious when created outside of expected paths.
ProcessAllowlist	Known business processes permitted to use compression/encryption utilities.
FileSizeThresholdMB	Minimum file size for flagging archive creation to reduce noise from benign small compressions.

AN1459 · Linux

Detects adversarial archiving activity through invocation of utilities like tar, gzip, bzip2, or openssl used in non-administrative or unusual contexts. Correlates command execution patterns with file creation of compressed/encrypted outputs in staging directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp).

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
File CreationDC0039	auditd:FILE	create: Creation of files ending in .tar, .gz, .bz2, .zip in /tmp or /var/tmp
Command ExecutionDC0064	auditd:SYSCALL	execve: Execution of tar, gzip, bzip2, or openssl with output redirection

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
ArchiveCommands	List of archiving/encryption utilities considered sensitive in the monitored environment.
SuspiciousDirectories	Paths where archive creation is suspicious (e.g., /tmp, user home directories).
TimeWindow	Temporal window to correlate command execution with file creation events.

AN1460 · macOS

Detects use of macOS-native archiving or encryption tools (zip, ditto, hdiutil) for staging collected data. Identifies unexpected invocation of archive utilities by Office apps, browsers, or background daemons. Correlates file creation of .zip/.dmg containers with process lineage anomalies.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	macos:unifiedlog	Execution of zip, ditto, hdiutil, or openssl by non-terminal parent processes
File CreationDC0039	macos:unifiedlog	Creation of .zip or .dmg files in user-accessible or temporary directories

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
AllowedArchiveUtilities	Business-approved applications (e.g., Time Machine, backup agents) that generate archives.
UserContext	Threshold for flagging archive creation under privileged or service accounts.
PayloadEntropyThreshold	Entropy threshold for detecting encrypted archives versus standard compressed files.

Tests1ExecutorsPowerShell 1Need elevation0 of 1Have prerequisites0Have cleanup1Platformswindows

Test

Platform

Executor

Elevation

Prereqs

Cleanup

Ref

Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell

windows

PowerShell

—

Yes

An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration. When the test completes you should find the files from the $env:USERPROFILE directory compressed in a file called T1560-data-ps.zip in the $env:USERPROFILE directory

Input arguments

Name	Type	Default	Description
input_file	path	$env:USERPROFILE	Path that should be compressed into our output file
output_file	path	$env:USERPROFILE\T1560-data-ps.zip	Path where resulting compressed data should be placed

Attack command

dir #{input_file} -Recurse | Compress-Archive -DestinationPath #{output_file}

Cleanup command

Remove-Item -path #{output_file} -ErrorAction Ignore

GUID9fc7982e-bf3a-4106-9896-7f60fd02f911

Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition

Archive Collected Data detections T1560

7 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

69th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

Severity

Library

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