An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.[1] Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.
Top 14%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
13 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has encrypted files and information before exfiltration.12
created 2017-05-312 referencesaka Cicada
All 13 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
44 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Has encrypted collected credentials using AES-CBC from the CNG API and the key ED15C8344B45DAED1E0578F8BC1A32411812C61F4CB45D89B107287DE0E09FFC
and the initialization vector 91A4E6F6D51DAEE773A8F00279792578.1
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detect Archiving and Encryption of Collected Data (T1560)
Enterprise
3 platforms
AN1458 · Windows
Detects adversarial archiving of files prior to exfiltration by correlating execution of compression/encryption utilities (e.g., makecab.exe, rar.exe, 7z.exe, powershell Compress-Archive) with subsequent creation of large compressed or encrypted files. Identifies abnormal process lineage involving crypt32.dll usage, command-line arguments invoking compression switches, and file write operations to temporary or staging directories.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
ArchiveExtensions
List of file extensions treated as suspicious when created outside of expected paths.
ProcessAllowlist
Known business processes permitted to use compression/encryption utilities.
FileSizeThresholdMB
Minimum file size for flagging archive creation to reduce noise from benign small compressions.
AN1459 · Linux
Detects adversarial archiving activity through invocation of utilities like tar, gzip, bzip2, or openssl used in non-administrative or unusual contexts. Correlates command execution patterns with file creation of compressed/encrypted outputs in staging directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp).
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
execve: Execution of tar, gzip, bzip2, or openssl with output redirection
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
ArchiveCommands
List of archiving/encryption utilities considered sensitive in the monitored environment.
SuspiciousDirectories
Paths where archive creation is suspicious (e.g., /tmp, user home directories).
TimeWindow
Temporal window to correlate command execution with file creation events.
AN1460 · macOS
Detects use of macOS-native archiving or encryption tools (zip, ditto, hdiutil) for staging collected data. Identifies unexpected invocation of archive utilities by Office apps, browsers, or background daemons. Correlates file creation of .zip/.dmg containers with process lineage anomalies.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
System scans can be performed to identify unauthorized archival utilities.
Tests1Executorspowershell 1Need elevation0 of 1Have prerequisites0Have cleanup1Platformswindows
#
Test
Platform
Executor
Elevation
Prereqs
Cleanup
Ref
01
Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell
windows
powershell
—
—
Yes
An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration.
When the test completes you should find the files from the $env:USERPROFILE directory compressed in a file called T1560-data-ps.zip in the $env:USERPROFILE directory
Inputs
Name
Description
Type
Default Value
input_file
Path that should be compressed into our output file
path
$env:USERPROFILE
output_file
Path where resulting compressed data should be placed
path
$env:USERPROFILE\T1560-data-ps.zip
Attack Commandsrun with powershell
dir #{input_file} -Recurse | Compress-Archive -DestinationPath #{output_file}
Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
2021-08-09
2022-10-09
aa92fd02-09f2-48b0-8a93-864813fb8f41
Splunk
The following analytic detects the use of the Certipy tool to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments by identifying unique file modifications. (...)