DaggerflyG1034 ↗
Created code signing certificates to sign malicious macOS files.1
tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique
Code Signing Certificates T1587.002
sub-technique of T1587 Develop Capabilities
- Tactic
- Resource Development
- Platform
- PRE
- Version
- 1.1
- Created
- 01 October 2020
- Last modified
- 24 October 2025
Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.[1] Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact
3
Threat groups64th pct
Threat groups64th percentile · 64% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.1
Campaigns72nd pct
Campaigns72nd percentile · 72% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.1
Detection rules42nd pct
Detection rules42nd percentile · 58% of ATT&CK techniques have more detection rules written.Code Signing Certificates MITRE reference T1587.002
64th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
3 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
PROMETHIUMG0056 ↗
Has created self-signed certificates to sign malicious installers.1
PatchworkG0040 ↗
Has created self-signed certificates from fictitious and spoofed legitimate software companies that were later used to sign malware.1
All 3 groups for this technique
1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
Operation Dream JobC0022 ↗
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group digitally signed their malware and the dbxcli utility.1
All 1 campaigns for this technique
Offense vs defense T1587.002
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Range
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 0Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 1
first rule: 2025 Q2 · 0 of 1 campaigns plotted (Operation Dream Job (dated 2019) falls before the 2022 window)Code Signing Certificates detection strategy DET0833
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Code Signing Certificates
1 platform
AN1965 · PRE
Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as Code Signing or Install Root Certificate.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Malware MetadataDC0003 | Malware Repository | None |
Pre-compromiseM1056
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.