PyDCrypt is malware written in Python designed to deliver DCSrv. It has been used by Moses Staff since at least September 2021, with each sample tailored for its intended victim organization.[1]
11
Techniques51st pct
4
Tactics32nd pct
1
Threat groupunranked
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
PyDCrypt has attempted to execute with PowerShell.7
Execution300 detection rules
Standing S1032
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques1151st pct
51st percentile · 51% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics432nd pct
32nd percentile · 68% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat group161% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique30medTop 22%
78th percentile · 78% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many detection rules per technique or fewer.
Tests / technique8med72nd pct
72nd percentile · 72% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many atomic tests per technique or fewer.
Data comps / technique4med54% tie · 11 values
54% of the population shares a single value across only 11 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Mitigations / technique2medTop 9%
91st percentile · 91% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many mitigations per technique or fewer.
5 of 8 axes carry an honest rank on this page. Coverage medians are taken across this malware’s 11 Enterprise techniques.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
The following analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, privilege escalation, password dumping or data exfiltration. (...)
Detects the Linux-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency by Axios NPM package, including payload download via curl and detached execution using nohup and python3. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of CertUtil.exe with the 'decode' argument, which may indicate an attempt to decode a previously encoded file, potentially containing malicious payloads. (...)
The following analytic identifies the execution of the "whoami" command with the "/group" flag, where the results are passed to the "find" command in order to look for a the string "12288". (...)
The following analytic detects potential reverse shell activity by identifying connections involving ports commonly associated with remote access tools, shell listeners, or tunneling utilities. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of `cmd.exe /c` to execute commands, a technique often employed by adversaries and malware to run batch commands or invoke other shells like PowerShell. (...)
The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. (...)
Detects execution of wmic utility with the "computersystem" flag in order to obtain information about the machine such as the domain, username, model, etc.
The following analytic detects the use of the Certify tool via an in-memory PowerShell function to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. (...)
The following analytic detects executions of cmd.exe spawned by processes that are commonly abused by attackers and do not typically launch cmd.exe. (...)
The following detects the execution of cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes spawned by cmd.exe, leveraging Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry mapped to the Endpoint data model, with additional contextual filtering to improve fidelity and reduce false positives. (...)
This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqlps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the MSSQL Server. (...)