Disk Wipe T1561
- Tactic
- Impact
- Platforms
- Linux, macOS, Windows, Network Devices
- Version
- 1.2
- Created
- 20 February 2020
- Last modified
- 24 October 2025
- Contributor
- Austin Clark, @c2defense
Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted.
Offense vs defense T1561
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
Disk Wipe detection strategy DET0137
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Disk Wipe via Direct Disk Access and Destructive Commands
AN0384 · Windows
Unusual direct disk access attempts (e.g., use of \\.\PhysicalDrive notation), abnormal writes to MBR/boot sectors, and installation of kernel drivers that grant raw disk access. Correlate anomalous process creation with disk modification attempts and driver loads.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account MetadataDC0013 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4673 |
| Drive ModificationDC0046 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | Raw disk write access via \\.\PhysicalDrive* or \\.\C: |
| Driver LoadDC0079 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=6 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| ProcessWhitelist | Legitimate disk imaging or backup tools may trigger raw disk access — must be excluded per environment. |
| TimeWindow | Correlate disk access, driver load, and process execution within a short timeframe to minimize false positives. |
AN0385 · Linux
Processes invoking destructive commands (dd, shred, wipe) with raw device targets (e.g., /dev/sda, /dev/nvme0n1). Detect direct writes to disk partitions and abnormal superblock or bootloader modifications. Correlate shell execution with subsequent block device I/O.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | auditd:EXECVE | Execution of dd, shred, wipe targeting block devices |
| Drive AccessDC0054 | auditd:SYSCALL | open/write syscalls on /dev/sd* or /dev/nvme* |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TargetDevices | Tune to exclude removable drives or test partitions commonly written by administrators. |
| EntropyThreshold | Detects large blocks of pseudorandom data being written; may need tuning for backup/crypto workloads. |
AN0386 · macOS
Abnormal invocation of diskutil, asr, or low-level APIs (IOKit) to erase/partition drives. Correlate process execution with unified log entries showing destructive disk operations.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Drive ModificationDC0046 | macos:unifiedlog | IOKit disk write calls targeting raw devices |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | macos:unifiedlog | diskutil eraseDisk / asr restore with destructive flags |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| AdminToolWhitelist | System administrators may legitimately use diskutil/asr for provisioning — whitelist by user or context. |
AN0387 · Network Devices
Execution of destructive CLI commands such as 'erase startup-config', 'erase flash:' or 'format disk' on routers/switches. Detect privilege level escalation preceding destructive commands.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account AuthenticationDC0002 | networkdevice:syslog | User privilege escalation to level 15/root prior to destructive commands |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | networkdevice:cli | erase flash:, erase startup-config, format disk |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| PrivilegedUsers | Tune to exclude approved maintenance sessions by known administrators. |
| CommandPatterns | Adjust monitored destructive command list depending on device vendor and OS. |
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data. Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery.