tfMITRE ATT&CK technique

Software Extensions T1176

Tactic: Persistence
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Version: 2.0
Created: 16 January 2018
Last modified: 24 October 2025
Contributors: Chris Ross @xorrior; Justin Warner, ICEBRG; Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India

Sub-techniques 24 rules across the family · 1 mapped directly to T1176 · 1 of 2 carry rules

.001Browser Extensions3 .002IDE Extensions0

Adversaries may abuse software extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Software extensions are modular components that enhance or customize the functionality of software applications, including web browsers, Integrated Development Environments (IDEs), and other platforms.[1][2] Extensions are typically installed via official marketplaces, app stores, or manually loaded by users, and they often inherit the permissions and access levels of the host application.

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsNone recorded

Threat groupsNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malwareNone recorded

Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Detection rules42nd pct

Detection rules42nd percentile · 58% of ATT&CK techniques have more detection rules written.

Offense vs defense T1176

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 1Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 0

first rule: 2022 Q1

Software Extensions detection strategy DET0092

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detection of Malicious or Unauthorized Software Extensions

Enterprise

3 platforms

AN0251 · Windows

Installation or execution of a malicious browser or IDE extension, followed by abnormal registry entries or outbound network connections from the host application

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=4688
File CreationDC0039	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=11
Windows Registry Key ModificationDC0063	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=13, 14
Network Connection CreationDC0082	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=3, 22

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
Image	Path of browser or IDE launching subprocesses—may vary depending on installed applications
ParentImage	Legitimate parent-child process relationships for known safe extensions
RegistryPath	Expected registry keys under HKCU/HKLM for installed extensions
TimeWindow	Tunable interval to correlate extension install with follow-on C2 traffic

AN0252 · macOS

Installation of configuration profiles or plist entries associated with malicious or unauthorized browser extensions

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
File CreationDC0039	macos:unifiedlog	Creation of .plist under /Library/Managed Preferences/
Command ExecutionDC0064	macos:unifiedlog	Execution of 'profiles install -type=configuration'
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	macos:unifiedlog	Suspicious outbound traffic from browser binary to non-standard domains

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
PlistPath	Directory path for user-specific extension configuration files
CommandLine	Usage of profiles CLI tool—can be modified by legitimate tools or MDMs
TimeWindow	Correlation window between configuration install and observable extension behavior

AN0253 · Linux

Manual or script-based installation of extension-like modules into browser config directories or IDE plugin paths, followed by suspicious network activity

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	auditd:SYSCALL	execve
File CreationDC0039	fs:fileevents	creat
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	NSM:Flow	Abnormal browser traffic volume or destination

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
DirectoryPath	Common plugin or extension directories may vary by distro or browser (e.g., ~/.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions)
ExecPath	Path to scripting tools used in installation (e.g., bash, curl, unzip)
TimeWindow	Tunable interval between install and first network beacon

Tests4Executorsmanual 3 · PowerShell 1Need elevation1 of 4Have prerequisites0Have cleanup1Platformslinux, windows, macos

# Test Platform Executor Elevation Prereqs Cleanup Ref

01 Chrome/Chromium (Developer Mode) linux, windows, macos manual — — —

Turn on Chrome/Chromium developer mode and Load Extension found in the src directory

Attack command

No command — this test is a manual procedure.

GUIDa0dee5ab-3bf4-46fd-9602-c36cba86c89e

02 Firefox linux, windows, macos manual — — —

Create a file called test.wma, with the duration of 30 seconds

Attack command

No command — this test is a manual procedure.

GUIDee023d2b-8a6d-450d-b25f-789e0538147a

03 Edge Chromium Addon - VPN windows, macos manual — — —

Adversaries may use VPN extensions in an attempt to hide traffic sent from a compromised host. This will install one (of many) available VPNS in the Edge add-on store.

Attack command

No command — this test is a manual procedure.

GUID9edfcdf3-032b-4c00-8626-145901c1a301

04 Google Chrome Load Unpacked Extension With Command Line windows PowerShell Required — Yes

This test loads an unpacked extension in Google Chrome with the --load-extension parameter. This technique was previously used by the Grandoreiro malware to load a malicious extension that would capture the browsing history, steal cookies and other user information. Other malwares also leverage this technique to hijack searches, steal passwords, inject ads, and more. References: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/ https://securityintelligence.com/posts/grandoreiro-malware-now-targeting-banks-in-spain/

Input arguments

Name	Type	Default	Description
working_dir	string	$env:TEMP	Working directory where the files will be downloaded and extracted

Attack command


# Chromium
$chromium =  "https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-browser-snapshots/Win_x64/1153778/chrome-win.zip"

# uBlock Origin Lite to test side-loading
$extension = "https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uBOL-home/releases/download/uBOLite_2024.11.25.1376/uBOLite_2024.11.25.1376.chromium.mv3.zip"

Set-Location "#{working_dir}"

Set-Variable ProgressPreference SilentlyContinue
Invoke-WebRequest -URI $chromium -OutFile "#{working_dir}\chrome.zip"
Invoke-WebRequest -URI $extension -OutFile "#{working_dir}\extension.zip"


Expand-Archive chrome.zip -DestinationPath "#{working_dir}" -Force
Expand-Archive extension.zip -Force

Start-Process .\chrome-win\chrome.exe --load-extension="#{working_dir}\extension\" -PassThru

Cleanup command

Set-Location "#{working_dir}"
Stop-Process -Name chrome -Force
Remove-Item .\chrome.zip, .\chrome-win, .\extension, .\extension.zip -Recurse -Force
Set-Variable ProgressPreference Continue

GUID37185de8-6240-4748-996e-a60d77f15416

Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition

Software Extensions detections T1176

1 rule is mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

42nd pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

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