tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

IDE Extensions T1176.002

sub-technique of T1176 Software Extensions

Tactic: Persistence
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Version: 1.0
Created: 30 March 2025
Last modified: 23 April 2025
Contributors: Raghvendra Mishra, Arista Networks; Kevin Ward; Fabian Kammel

Adversaries may abuse an integrated development environment (IDE) extension to establish persistent access to victim systems.[1] IDEs such as Visual Studio Code, IntelliJ IDEA, and Eclipse support extensions - software components that add features like code linting, auto-completion, task automation, or integration with tools like Git and Docker. A malicious extension can be installed through an extension marketplace (i.e., Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools) or side-loaded directly into the IDE.[2][3]

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groups56th pct

Threat groups56th percentile · 56% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malwareNone recorded

Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Detection rulesNone recorded

Detection rulesNone recorded · 33% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

IDE Extensions MITRE reference T1176.002

56th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups

2 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.

TeamPCPG1056 ↗

Has compromised VS Code and Open VSX IDE extensions.1 2 3 4 5

created 2026-07-165 referencesaka PCPCat

Mustang PandaG0129 ↗

Has leveraged Visual Studio Code’s (VSCode) embedded reverse shell feature using the command code.exe tunnel to execute code and deliver additional payloads.1

created 2021-04-121 referenceaka TA416

All 2 groups for this technique

Offense vs defense T1176.002

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

IDE Extensions detection strategy DET0561

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detect malicious IDE extension install/usage and IDE tunneling

Enterprise

3 platforms

AN1548 · Windows

Adversary installs or side-loads an IDE extension (VS Code, IntelliJ/JetBrains, Eclipse) or enables IDE tunneling. Chain: (1) IDE binary starts on a non-developer endpoint or server, often with install/force/tunnel flags → (2) extension files/registrations appear under user profile → (3) browser/IDE initiates outbound connections to extension marketplaces, update endpoints, or IDE remote/tunnel services → (4) optional child tools (ssh, node, powershell) execute under the IDE context.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=4688
File CreationDC0039	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=11
Network Connection CreationDC0082	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=3, 22

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
IDEList	Executable names/paths (e.g., code.exe, idea64.exe, eclipse.exe, jetbrains-gateway.exe) vary by version and packaging.
SuspiciousCLI	Flags such as --install-extension, --force, --disable-extensions, --user-data-dir, --uninstall-extension, tunnel/remote flags are tunable.
ServerZones	List of hosts where IDEs should never run (prod servers, DCs).
AllowedHosts	Approved extension marketplaces/ide services; use to suppress benign traffic.
TimeWindow	Correlation horizon (e.g., 15–30m) between process start, file writes, and outbound IDE/tunnel connections.

AN1549 · Linux

Adversary installs or abuses IDE extensions via CLI or direct write to profile directories and then communicates with marketplaces or remote tunnel services. Chain: auditd execve (code/idea/eclipse) with install/update flags or writes under ~/.vscode/extensions, ~/.config/JetBrains → outbound flows to *.visualstudio.com, marketplace.visualstudio.com, *.jetbrains.com, githubusercontent.com, or SSH/WebSocket tunnel endpoints → optional ssh/node processes spawned by IDE.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	auditd:SYSCALL	execve
File CreationDC0039	auditd:SYSCALL	open,creat,rename,write
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	NSM:Flow	Connections from IDE hosts to marketplace/tunnel domains

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
IDEPaths	Per-distro/profile extension directories differ; tune for Chromium/JetBrains snap/flatpak paths.
DomainAllowlist	Enterprise-approved repos and proxies to reduce FPs.
UserRoleScope	Limit to non-developer users or production servers.
TimeWindow	Join horizon across file, process, and network telemetry.

AN1550 · macOS

Adversary adds IDE extensions or plugins (VS Code, JetBrains Toolbox/EAP, Eclipse) via GUI or CLI, possibly via managed profiles. Chain: process start with install/update flags → plist/extension folder changes under ~/Library/Application Support/Code or ~/Library/Application Support/JetBrains → outbound connections to marketplaces/tunnel services → optional helper (ssh/node) spawned.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Process CreationDC0032	macos:unifiedlog	Execution of Code.app, idea, JetBrainsToolbox, eclipse with install/extension flags
File CreationDC0039	macos:unifiedlog	Writes under ~/Library/Application Support/Code*/extensions or JetBrains plugins
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	macos:unifiedlog	Outbound connections from IDE processes to marketplace/tunnel domains

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
PlistLocations	Per-app preference domains and plugin directories vary by version.
MDMProfiles	If MDM installs extensions, allowlist those events to avoid FPs.
TimeWindow	Correlation range between install and first beacon.

IDE Extensions detections T1176.002

No detection rules are mapped to this technique yet.

None recorded— 33% of ATT&CK techniques have none either

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