tfMITRE ATT&CK technique

Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates T1649

Tactic: Credential Access
Platforms: Windows, Linux, macOS, Identity Provider
Version: 1.2
Created: 03 August 2022
Last modified: 04 August 2026
Contributors: Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence; Lee Christensen, SpecterOps; Thirumalai Natarajan, Mandiant

Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.[1][2]

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groups45th pct

Threat groups45th percentile · 55% of ATT&CK techniques have more threat groups attributed.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malware57th pct

Tools & malware57th percentile · 57% of ATT&CK techniques have this many tools implementing them or fewer.

Detection rulesTop 10%

Detection rules90th percentile · 90% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates MITRE reference T1649

45th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups

1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.

APT29G0016 ↗

Has abused misconfigured AD CS certificate templates to impersonate admin users and create additional authentication certificates.1

created 2017-05-311 referenceaka IRON RITUAL

All 1 groups for this technique

3 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.

Mini Shai-HuludS9043 ↗

Has collected victim client certificates to assist in signed authentication assertion with Azure environments.1

created 2026-07-29MALWAREcarried by 1 group

AADInternalsS0677 ↗

Can create and export various authentication certificates, including those associated with Azure AD joined/registered devices.1

created 2022-02-01TOOLcarried by 2 groups

MimikatzS0002 ↗

Mimikatz's CRYPTO module can create and export various types of authentication certificates.1

created 2017-05-31TOOLcarried by 51 groups

All 3 software entries for this technique

Offense vs defense T1649

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 11Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 18

first rule: 2021 Q1

Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates detection strategy DET0240

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detection Strategy for Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

Enterprise

4 platforms

AN0671 · Windows

Monitor for abnormal certificate enrollment and usage activity in Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), registry access to certificate storage locations, and unusual process executions that attempt to export or access private keys.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Windows Registry Key AccessDC0050	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=4657
Active Directory Credential RequestDC0084	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=4768

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
EKU_Thresholds	Organizations may tune which Extended Key Usage (EKU) values are considered risky.
TimeWindow	Defines how quickly multiple certificate enrollments from the same entity should trigger correlation alerts.
LogonContext	Differentiate between service accounts and interactive user accounts to reduce false positives.

AN0672 · Linux

Monitor for file access to certificate directories, commands invoking OpenSSL or PKCS#12 utilities to export or modify certificates, and processes accessing sensitive key storage paths.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
File AccessDC0055	auditd:SYSCALL	open, read: /etc/ssl/, /etc/pki/, ~/.pki/nssdb/
Command ExecutionDC0064	auditd:SYSCALL	execve: openssl pkcs12, certutil, keytool

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
PathExclusions	Exempt trusted automated services regularly accessing PKI stores.
UserContext	Differentiate root/system accounts versus user-level access to key material.

AN0673 · macOS

Monitor for security commands and API calls interacting with the Keychain, as well as file access attempts to stored certificates and private keys in ~/Library/Keychains or /Library/Keychains.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
File AccessDC0055	macos:keychain	~/Library/Keychains, /Library/Keychains
Command ExecutionDC0064	macos:unifiedlog	process calling security find-certificate, export, or import

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
ApplicationAllowList	Whitelist legitimate apps that interact with Keychain to reduce false positives.

AN0674 · Identity Provider

Monitor for abnormal certificate enrollment events in identity platforms, unexpected use of token-signing certificates, and unusual CA configuration modifications.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Application Log ContentDC0038	m365:unified	certificate added or modified in application credentials
Active Directory Object ModificationDC0066	azure:signinlogs	Add certificate credential, Update certificate credential

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
GeoContext	Detect certificate-related changes occurring from unusual geographic locations.
Thresholds	Adjust enrollment/issuance request volume thresholds per tenant size.

Active Directory ConfigurationM1015

Ensure certificate authorities (CA) are properly secured, including treating CA servers (and other resources hosting CA certificates) as tier 0 assets. Harden abusable CA settings and attributes. For example, consider disabling the usage of AD CS certificate SANs within relevant authentication protocol settings to enforce strict user mappings and prevent certificates from authenticating as other identifies. Also consider enforcing CA Certificate Manager approval for the templates that include SAN as an issuance requirement.

AuditM1047

Check and remediate unneeded existing authentication certificates as well as common abusable misconfigurations of CA settings and permissions, such as AD CS certificate enrollment permissions and published overly permissive certificate templates (which define available settings for created certificates). For example, available AD CS certificate templates can be checked via the Certificate Authority MMC snap-in (certsrv.msc). certutil.exe can also be used to examine various information within an AD CS CA database.

Disable or Remove Feature or ProgramM1042

Consider disabling old/dangerous authentication protocols (e.g. NTLM), as well as unnecessary certificate features, such as potentially vulnerable AD CS web and other enrollment server roles.

Encrypt Sensitive InformationM1041

Ensure certificates as well as associated private keys are appropriately secured. Consider utilizing additional hardware credential protections such as trusted platform modules (TPM) or hardware security modules (HSM). Enforce HTTPS and enable Extended Protection for Authentication.

Tests1ExecutorsPowerShell 1Need elevation0 of 1Have prerequisites0Have cleanup1Platformswindows

#	Test	Platform	Executor	Elevation	Prereqs	Cleanup	Ref
01	Staging Local Certificates via Export-Certificate	windows	PowerShell	—	—	Yes
Export all user certificates and add to a compressed archive. Attack command $archive="$env:PUBLIC\T1649\atomic_certs.zip" $exfilpath="$env:PUBLIC\T1649\certs" Add-Type -assembly "system.io.compression.filesystem" Remove-Item $(split-path $exfilpath) -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore mkdir $exfilpath \| Out-Null foreach ($cert in (gci Cert:\CurrentUser\My)) { Export-Certificate -Cert $cert -FilePath $exfilpath\$($cert.FriendlyName).cer} [io.compression.zipfile]::CreateFromDirectory($exfilpath, $archive) Cleanup command $exfilpath="$env:PUBLIC\T1649\certs" Remove-Item $(split-path $exfilpath) -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Ignore GUID98e9361b-883c-48bf-933e-468a03e65f5f

Test

Platform

Executor

Elevation

Prereqs

Cleanup

Ref

Staging Local Certificates via Export-Certificate

windows

PowerShell

—

Yes

Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition

Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates detections T1649

29 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

Top 10%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

(none) 1

Severity

Library

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