WEBC2 is a family of backdoor malware used by APT1 as early as July 2006. WEBC2 backdoors are designed to retrieve a webpage, with commands hidden in HTML comments or special tags, from a predetermined C2 server. [1][2]
3
TechniquesBottom 12%
3
TacticsBottom 21%
1
Threat groupunranked
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
Variants of WEBC2 achieve persistence by using DLL search order hijacking, usually by copying the DLL file to %SYSTEMROOT% (C:\WINDOWS\ntshrui.dll).5
Execution · Stealth112 detection rules
Standing S0109
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques3Bottom 12%
12th percentile · 88% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics3Bottom 21%
21st percentile · 79% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat group161% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique112medTop 1%
100th percentile · None of the 825 ATT&CK software entries has more detection rules per technique — the highest in the population.
Tests / technique7med
WEBC2 detections S0109
303 distinct rules cover the 3 techniques recorded for this malware. 223 Sigma · 80 Splunk.
3 covered by at least one rule303 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 300+ rules
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Description
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Event
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Author
Created
Updated
ID
Refs
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Detects the Linux-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency by Axios NPM package, including payload download via curl and detached execution using nohup and python3. (...)
Detects the macOS-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency in Axios NPM Package, including AppleScript execution via osascript, payload download, permission modification, execution, and cleanup.
This analytic detects unexpected outbound network connections initiated by known webserver processes such as `httpd.exe`, `nginx.exe`, or `tomcat.exe` to common file sharing or public content hosting services like GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin. (...)
The following analytic detects potential reverse shell activity by identifying connections involving ports commonly associated with remote access tools, shell listeners, or tunneling utilities. (...)
The following analytic detects connections with a high Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) threat confidence score, indicating potentially malicious behavior within encrypted traffic. (...)
This analytic identifies Snort intrusion signatures that have been triggered by ten or more distinct internal IP addresses within a one-hour window. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of `cmd.exe /c` to execute commands, a technique often employed by adversaries and malware to run batch commands or invoke other shells like PowerShell. (...)
The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. (...)
Detects creation of specific system DLL files that are usually not present on the system (or at least not in system directories) but may be loaded by legitimate processes. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of the curl utility where the command line includes percent-encoded characters and explicit file output options (such as -o or --output). (...)
The following analytic detects executions of cmd.exe spawned by processes that are commonly abused by attackers and do not typically launch cmd.exe. (...)
The following detects the execution of cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes spawned by cmd.exe, leveraging Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry mapped to the Endpoint data model, with additional contextual filtering to improve fidelity and reduce false positives. (...)
Detects DNS queries made by the finger utility, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices. (...)