OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D is a macOS backdoor used by APT32. First discovered in 2015, APT32 has continued to make improvements using a plugin architecture to extend capabilities, specifically using .dylib files. OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can also determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (root or user).[1][2][3]
28
TechniquesTop 9%
8
TacticsTop 20%
1
Threat groupunranked
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses file naming conventions with associated executable locations to blend in with the macOS TimeMachine and OpenSSL services. Such as, naming a LaunchAgent plist file com.apple.openssl.plist which executes OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D from the user's ~/Library/OpenSSL/ folder upon user login.9
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has disguised it's true file structure as an application bundle by adding special characters to the filename and using the icon for legitimate Word documents.10
Stealth4 detection rules
Standing S0352
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques28Top 9%
91st percentile · 91% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics8Top 20%
80th percentile · 80% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many tactics spanned or fewer.
Threat group161% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique7.5medBottom 10%
10th percentile · 90% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique4med28th pct
28th percentile · 72% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more atomic tests per technique.
Data comps / technique4med54% tie · 11 values
54% of the population shares a single value across only 11 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Mitigations / technique1med57th pct
57th percentile · 57% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many mitigations per technique or fewer.
5 of 8 axes carry an honest rank on this page. Coverage medians are taken across this malware’s 28 Enterprise techniques.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Detects the Linux-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency by Axios NPM package, including payload download via curl and detached execution using nohup and python3. (...)
Detects the macOS-specific execution chain of the plain-crypto-js malicious npm dependency in Axios NPM Package, including AppleScript execution via osascript, payload download, permission modification, execution, and cleanup.
The following analytic detects the use of CertUtil.exe with the 'decode' argument, which may indicate an attempt to decode a previously encoded file, potentially containing malicious payloads. (...)
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. (...)
This analytic detects potential reconnaissance activities on Cisco ASA devices by identifying execution of multiple information-gathering "show" commands within a short timeframe. (...)