MoonWind can execute commands via an interactive command shell.6MoonWind uses batch scripts for various purposes, including to restart and uninstall itself.6
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques1566th pct
66th percentile · 66% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics8Top 20%
80th percentile · 80% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many tactics spanned or fewer.
Threat groups061% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique10medBottom 15%
15th percentile · 85% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique6med
MoonWind detections S0149
338 distinct rules cover the 15 techniques recorded for this malware. 236 Sigma · 102 Splunk.
14 covered by at least one rule1 with no coverage338 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 300+ rules
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Title
Description
Category
Status
Event
OS
Product
MITRE ATT&CK
CVEs
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Created
Updated
ID
Refs
Detects the deletion of the "Zone.Identifier" ADS. (...)
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
The following analytic identifies the execution of the "whoami" command with the "/group" flag, where the results are passed to the "find" command in order to look for a the string "12288". (...)
This analytic detects potential reconnaissance activities on Cisco ASA devices by identifying execution of multiple information-gathering "show" commands within a short timeframe. (...)
The following analytic detects potential reverse shell activity by identifying connections involving ports commonly associated with remote access tools, shell listeners, or tunneling utilities. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of `cmd.exe /c` to execute commands, a technique often employed by adversaries and malware to run batch commands or invoke other shells like PowerShell. (...)
The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. (...)
The following analytic identifies specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that indicate reconnaissance attempts to find vulnerable JBoss servers. (...)
The following analytic detects executions of cmd.exe spawned by processes that are commonly abused by attackers and do not typically launch cmd.exe. (...)
The following detects the execution of cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes spawned by cmd.exe, leveraging Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry mapped to the Endpoint data model, with additional contextual filtering to improve fidelity and reduce false positives. (...)
E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community
2019-10-24
2022-06-28
b243b280-65fe-48df-ba07-6ddea7646427
Detects DNS queries made by the finger utility, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices. (...)