Pikabot was distributed in Pikabot Distribution February 2024 using malicious emails with embedded links leading to malicious ZIP archives requiring user interaction for follow-on infection. The version of Pikabot distributed featured significant changes over the 2023 variant, including reduced code complexity and simplified obfuscation mechanisms.[1][2]
4
TechniquesBottom 7%
3
TacticsBottom 13%
1
Tool or malware45th pct
0
Threat groupsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
Pikabot Distribution February 2024 MITRE reference C0036
Pikabot Distribution February 2024 utilized a tampered legitimate executable, grepWinNP3.exe, for its first stage Pikabot loader, modifying the open-source tool to execute malicious code when launched.6
Execution · Stealth14 detection rules
Standing C0036
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this campaign touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 56 ATT&CK campaigns only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques4Bottom 7%
7th percentile · 93% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics3Bottom 13%
13th percentile · 87% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more tactics spanned.
Tool or malware145th pct
45th percentile · 55% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more tools and malware.
Threat groups055% tie · 3 values
55% of the population shares a single value across only 3 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique25medTop 25%
75th percentile · 75% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have this many detection rules per technique or fewer.
Tests / technique3med
Pikabot Distribution February 2024 detections C0036
358 distinct rules cover the 4 techniques recorded for this campaign. 270 Sigma · 88 Splunk.
4 covered by at least one rule358 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 300+ rules
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Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
The following analytic detects potential reverse shell activity by identifying connections involving ports commonly associated with remote access tools, shell listeners, or tunneling utilities. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of the Certify tool via an in-memory PowerShell function to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. (...)
This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqlps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the MSSQL Server. (...)
The following analytic detects the usage of specific Exchange PowerShell modules, such as New-MailboxExportRequest, New-ManagementRoleAssignment, New-MailboxSearch, and Get-Recipient. (...)
Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community
2020-10-17
2021-08-14
d6d9f4fb-4c1c-4f53-b306-62a22c7c61e1
Splunk
The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-ForestTrust command from PowerSploit using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` PowerShell commandlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). (...)