admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. [1]
12
Techniques39th pct
4
TacticsBottom 20%
7
Tools & malware69th pct
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
admin@338 actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to obtain information about services: net start >> %temp%\download2
admin@338 actors used the following command after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to acquire information about local networks: ipconfig /all >> %temp%\download3
admin@338 actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to display network connections: netstat -ano >> %temp%\download5
Following exploitation with LOWBALL malware, admin@338 actors created a file containing a list of commands to be executed on the compromised computer.6
admin@338 actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to list local groups: net localgroup administrator >> %temp%\download7
Discovery30 detection rules
Standing G0018
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this group touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 176 ATT&CK groups only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques1239th pct
39th percentile · 61% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics4Bottom 20%
20th percentile · 80% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tactics spanned.
Tools & malware769th pct
69th percentile · 69% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many tools and malware or fewer.
Campaigns089% tie · 4 values
89% of the population shares a single value across only 4 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique30medTop 21%
79th percentile · 79% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many detection rules per technique or fewer.
Tests / technique7.5med
admin@338 detections G0018
411 distinct rules cover the 12 techniques recorded for this group. 263 Sigma · 148 Splunk.
12 covered by at least one rule411 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 400+ rules
Drag headers to reorder | Drag edges to resize
Select
Title
Description
Category
Status
Event
OS
Product
MITRE ATT&CK
CVEs
Severity
Author
Created
Updated
ID
Refs
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. (...)
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
The following analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, privilege escalation, password dumping or data exfiltration. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of a batch file (.bat) within the Windows system directory tree, specifically in the System32 or SysWOW64 folders. (...)
This analytic detects potential reconnaissance activities on Cisco ASA devices by identifying execution of multiple information-gathering "show" commands within a short timeframe. (...)
The following analytic detects file downloads involving executable, archive, or scripting-related file types that are commonly used in malware delivery. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of `cmd.exe /c` to execute commands, a technique often employed by adversaries and malware to run batch commands or invoke other shells like PowerShell. (...)
The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. (...)
Detects exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-38331 (WinRAR before v6.23), where an attacker can leverage WinRAR to execute arbitrary commands and binaries.
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
2023-08-30
2024-01-22
ec3a3c2f-9bb0-4a9b-8f4b-5ec386544343
Splunk
The following analytic identifies specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that indicate reconnaissance attempts to find vulnerable JBoss servers. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. (...)
The following analytic detects executions of cmd.exe spawned by processes that are commonly abused by attackers and do not typically launch cmd.exe. (...)