TeamPCPG1056 ↗
Has developed and deployed custom malware including TeamPCP Cloud Stealer, CanisterWorm, and Mini Shai-Hulud.1
- Tactic
- Resource Development
- Platform
- PRE
- Version
- 1.3
- Created
- 01 October 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.[1][2][3][4]
ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact
26
Threat groupsTop 7%
Threat groups93rd percentile · 93% of ATT&CK techniques have this many threat groups attributed or fewer.16
CampaignsTop 1%
Campaigns99th percentile · 99% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.12
Detection rulesTop 21%
Detection rules79th percentile · 79% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.Malware MITRE reference T1587.001
Top 7%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
26 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
VOID MANTICOREG1055 ↗
Has utilized custom-malware and wipers to include BiBi Wiper.1
MirrorFaceG1054 ↗
Has created and continued to develop custom strains of malware including LODEINFO.1
Contagious InterviewG1052 ↗
Has developed malware that utilizes Qt cross-platform framework to include BeaverTail.12
UNC3886G1048 ↗
Has deployed custom malware families on Fortinet and VMware systems.1
Salt TyphoonG1045 ↗
Has used custom tooling including JumbledPath.1
All 26 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
16 campaigns have been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
2025 Poland Wiper AttacksC0063 ↗
During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries observed that their malware was initially detected by the victims EDR solutions, so they modified the payload and attempted to execute the new version within the same day.123
RedPenguinC0056 ↗
During RedPenguin, UNC3886 deployed custom malware based on the publicly-available TINYSHELL backdoor.12
Versa Director Zero Day ExploitationC0039 ↗
Involved the development of a new web shell variant, VersaMem.1
ArcaneDoorC0046 ↗
Featured the development and deployment of two unique malware types, Line Dancer and Line Runner.12
Juicy MixC0044 ↗
For Juicy Mix, OilRig improved on Solar by developing the Mango backdoor.1
Outer SpaceC0042 ↗
For Outer Space, OilRig created new implants including the Solar backdoor.1
All 16 campaigns for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1587.001
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Range
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Campaigns · 15Sigma rules (cumulative) · 11Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 1
first rule: 2019 Q3 · 15 of 16 campaigns plotted (Operation AkaiRyū (dated 2004) falls before the 2016 window)Malware detection strategy DET0872
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection of Malware
1 platform
AN2004 · PRE
Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. Monitor for contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Malware MetadataDC0003 | Malware Repository | None |
| Malware ContentDC0011 | Malware Repository | None |
Pre-compromiseM1056
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.