MURKYTOP has the capability to delete local files.7
Stealth30 detection rules
Standing S0233
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques944th pct
44th percentile · 56% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics541st pct
41st percentile · 59% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat group161% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique30medTop 22%
78th percentile · 78% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many detection rules per technique or fewer.
Tests / technique11med
MURKYTOP detections S0233
261 distinct rules cover the 9 techniques recorded for this malware. 157 Sigma · 104 Splunk.
9 covered by at least one rule261 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 200+ rules
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Title
Description
Category
Status
Event
OS
Product
MITRE ATT&CK
CVEs
Severity
Author
Created
Updated
ID
Refs
Detects usage of the "Get-AdComputer" to enumerate Computers or properties within Active Directory.
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
This analytic detects potential reconnaissance activities on Cisco ASA devices by identifying execution of multiple information-gathering "show" commands within a short timeframe. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of `cmd.exe /c` to execute commands, a technique often employed by adversaries and malware to run batch commands or invoke other shells like PowerShell. (...)
The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. (...)
The following analytic identifies specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that indicate reconnaissance attempts to find vulnerable JBoss servers. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. (...)
The following analytic detects executions of cmd.exe spawned by processes that are commonly abused by attackers and do not typically launch cmd.exe. (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. (...)
The following detects the execution of cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes spawned by cmd.exe, leveraging Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry mapped to the Endpoint data model, with additional contextual filtering to improve fidelity and reduce false positives. (...)
Detects DNS queries made by the finger utility, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments `/dclist:` or `/dsgetdc:` to discover domain controllers. (...)
The following analytic identifies the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments used to discover domain controllers in a Windows domain. (...)