FIN4 is a financially-motivated threat group that has targeted confidential information related to the public financial market, particularly regarding healthcare and pharmaceutical companies, since at least 2013.[1][2]FIN4 is unique in that they do not infect victims with typical persistent malware, but rather they focus on capturing credentials authorized to access email and other non-public correspondence.[1][3]
12
Techniques39th pct
8
Tactics48th pct
0
Tools & malwareNone recorded
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
FIN4 has used Tor to log in to victims' email accounts.15
Command and Control6 detection rules
Standing G0085
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this group touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 176 ATT&CK groups only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques1239th pct
39th percentile · 61% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics848th pct
48th percentile · 52% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tactics spanned.
Tools & malware0Bottom 9%
9th percentile · 91% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tools and malware.
Campaigns089% tie · 4 values
89% of the population shares a single value across only 4 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique12med31st pct
31st percentile · 69% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique2.5med39th pct
39th percentile · 61% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more atomic tests per technique.
Data comps / technique4med65% tie · 12 values
65% of the population shares a single value across only 12 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Mitigations / technique3med43% tie · 11 values
43% of the population shares a single value across only 11 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
5 of 8 axes carry an honest rank on this page. Coverage medians are taken across this group’s 12 Enterprise techniques.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1', Tim Shelton
2022-08-11
2022-08-18
6f583da0-3a90-4566-a4ed-83c09fe18bbf
This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted.
Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
2022-06-01
—
248649b7-d64f-46f0-9fb2-a52774166fb5
Resource owner password credentials (ROPC) should be avoided if at all possible as this requires the user to expose their current password credentials to the application directly. (...)
Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
2022-06-01
—
55695bc0-c8cf-461f-a379-2535f563c854
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Identifies two sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also be atypical for the user, given past behavior.
The following analytic detects unusual authentication activity in Azure AD, specifically when a single user account has over 8 authentication attempts using 3+ unique application IDs and 5+ unique user agents within a short period. (...)
Detects a successful login to the Microsoft Intune Company Portal which could allow bypassing Conditional Access Policies and InTune device trust using a tool like TokenSmith.
The following analytic detects the creation of a batch file (.bat) within the Windows system directory tree, specifically in the System32 or SysWOW64 folders. (...)
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. (...)
This analytic detects the creation of privileged user accounts on Cisco IOS devices, which could indicate an attacker establishing backdoor access. (...)
This analytic detects the usage of the Utility osascript on a macOS device initiated a network connection lasting longer than 10 minutes (600 seconds). (...)
This analytic correlates risk events between privileged account creation on Cisco IOS devices and HTTP requests to privileged execution paths such as `/level/15/exec/-/*`. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of known suspicious SSL certificates in any observed event where the SSL_CertFingerprint field is present. (...)
The following analytic detects connections with a high Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) threat confidence score, indicating potentially malicious behavior within encrypted traffic. (...)