Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls.
Authentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.[1][2]
Caching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through Credential Access techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors.
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used forged SAML tokens that allowed the actors to impersonate users and bypass MFA, enabling APT29 to access enterprise cloud applications and services.12
2019–2021
All 1 campaigns for this technique
1 software entry is documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Use Alternate Authentication Material detection strategy DET0338
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 7 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Behavioral Detection Strategy for Use Alternate Authentication Material (T1550)
Enterprise
7 platforms
AN0954 · Windows
Use of stolen Kerberos tickets or token impersonation resulting in logon sessions from accounts without expected interactive logon events.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
Consider implementing token binding strategies, such as Azure AD token protection or OAuth Proof of Possession, that cryptographically bind a token to a secret. This may prevent the token from being used without knowledge of the secret or possession of the device the token is tied to.
Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems.
The following analytic identifies a non-lsass.exe process making an outbound connection on port 88, which is typically used by the Kerberos authentication protocol. (...)
This detection monitors changes to the following Active Directory attributes: "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo", "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity", "msDS-KeyCredentialLink", "scriptPath", and "msTSInitialProgram". (...)
The following analytic detects when a suspicious certificate with a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) is issued using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and then immediately used for authentication. (...)