During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used privileged accounts to replicate directory service data with domain controllers.141516
campaign
SolarWinds Compromise C0024
- First seen
- August 2019
- Last seen
- January 2021
- Created
- 24 March 2023
- Last modified
- 31 July 2026
The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[10][11][12] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[13]
71
TechniquesTop 1%
14
TacticsTop 4%
11
Tools & malwareTop 1%
1
Threat groupunranked
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
MITRE reference C0024
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 extracted files from compromised networks.17
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used GoldFinder to perform HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity and identify HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors that an HTTP request travels through.18
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used AdFind to enumerate remote systems.19
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used RDP sessions from public-facing systems to internal servers.20
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used administrative accounts to connect over SMB to targeted users.21
Standing C0024
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this campaign touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 56 ATT&CK campaigns only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques71Top 1%
100th percentile · None of the 56 ATT&CK campaigns has more Enterprise techniques — the highest in the population.
Tactics14Top 4%
96th percentile · 96% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have this many tactics spanned or fewer.
Tools & malware11Top 1%
100th percentile · None of the 56 ATT&CK campaigns has more tools and malware — the highest in the population.
Threat group155% tie · 3 values
55% of the population shares a single value across only 3 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique13med50th pct
50th percentile · 50% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique3
Detection coverage C0024
2079 distinct rules cover the 71 techniques recorded for this campaign. The 2378 technique-to-rule mappings resolve to 2079 distinct rules, because one rule can cover several techniques. 1320 Sigma · 759 Splunk.
63 covered by at least one rule8 with no coverage2079 distinct rules in total
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