Has deleted login notification emails and has cleared the Sent folder to cover their tracks.1
- Tactic
- Stealth
- Platforms
- Linux, macOS, Office Suite, Windows
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 08 July 2022
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributor
- Liran Ravich, CardinalOps
Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application or operating system, such as export requests.
Clear Mailbox Data MITRE reference T1070.008
2 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has manually deleted emails notifying users of suspicious account activity. 1
All 2 groups for this technique
1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 removed evidence of email export requests using Remove-MailboxExportRequest.1
All 1 campaigns for this technique
2 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can set the PR_DELETE_AFTER_SUBMIT flag to delete messages sent for data exfiltration.1
Has the ability to delete emails used for C2 once the content has been copied.1
All 2 software entries for this technique
Offense vs defense T1070.008
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Clear Mailbox Data detection strategy DET0266
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Behavioral Detection of Mailbox Data and Log Deletion for Anti-Forensics
AN0737 · Windows
Detects mailbox manipulation or deletion via PowerShell (e.g., Remove-MailboxExportRequest), file deletion from Outlook data stores (Unistore.db), or tampering with quarantined mail logs.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | m365:exchange | Transport Rule Modification |
| File DeletionDC0040 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=23 |
| File ModificationDC0061 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656 |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | WinEventLog:PowerShell | EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| MailstorePath | Outlook files in AppData\Local\Comms\Unistore\data |
| TransportRuleNames | Target suspicious rule changes (e.g., header removal) |
| PowerShellCommandMatch | Regex match on Remove-MailboxExportRequest and similar Exchange cmdlets |
AN0738 · Linux
Detects the use of mail utilities like mail or mailx to delete mailbox content, or file-level deletion of inbox files from /var/spool/mail/ or /var/mail/ following suspicious sessions.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | auditd:SYSCALL | execve |
| File DeletionDC0040 | auditd:SYSCALL | unlink/unlinkat |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| MailFolderPath | Common inbox file locations like /var/spool/mail/, /var/mail/ |
| CommandPattern | Usage of mailx or echo piped to mail followed by deletion |
AN0739 · macOS
Detects removal of Apple Mail artifacts via AppleScript or direct deletion of mailbox content in ~/Library/Mail/, especially when preceded by Remote Login or C2-related API access.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| File DeletionDC0040 | macos:osquery | file_events |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | macos:unifiedlog | log stream |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| ScriptCommandMatch | AppleScript references to Mail.app and delete commands |
| LibraryPathMatch | Files within ~/Library/Mail/V*/ folders |
AN0740 · Office Suite
Detects Exchange Online or on-prem transport rule changes (e.g., header stripping) and mailbox export cleanup via Remove-MailboxExportRequest, as well as admin actions via Exchange PowerShell sessions.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | m365:exchange | Admin Audit Logs, Transport Rules |
| Command ExecutionDC0064 | WinEventLog:PowerShell | Exchange Cmdlets |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| CmdletFilter | Include New-TransportRule, Set-TransportRule, Remove-* actions |
| UserRoleScope | Track role assignments for admins performing deletions |
In an Exchange environment, Administrators can use Get-TransportRule / Remove-TransportRule to discover and remove potentially malicious transport rules.
Automatically forward mail data and events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system.
Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition