Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. Token Impersonation/Theft) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. Create Process with Token). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.[1]
Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.
64th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
3 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
During C0017, APT41 used a ConfuserEx obfuscated BADPOTATO exploit to abuse named-pipe impersonation for local NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privilege escalation.1
2021–2022
All 1 campaigns for this technique
19 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can use AdjustTokenPrivileges to grant itself privileges for debugging with SeDebugPrivilege, creating backups with SeBackupPrivilege, loading drivers with SeLoadDriverPrivilege, and shutting down a local system with SeShutdownPrivilege.12
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Behavior-chain detection for T1134 Access Token Manipulation on Windows
Enterprise
1 platform
AN0786 · Windows
Detection of suspicious token manipulation chains: use of token-related APIs (e.g., LogonUser, DuplicateTokenEx) or commands (runas) → spawning of a new process under a different security context (e.g., SYSTEM) → mismatched parent-child process lineage or anomalies in Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) token/PPID data → abnormal lateral or privilege escalation activity.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.
Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas.
An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require.
Access Token Manipulation detections T1134
8 rules are mapped to this technique.
72nd pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules
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Title
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MITRE ATT&CK
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ID
Refs
Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK (...)
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords)
2021-12-20
2025-10-19
2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09
Splunk
The following analytic detects when a process running with low or medium integrity from a user account spawns an elevated process with high or system integrity in suspicious locations. (...)
The following analytic detects when a process with low, medium, or high integrity spawns a system integrity process from a user-controlled location. (...)