Keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.12
Create Process with Token T1134.002
- Tactics
- Privilege Escalation, Stealth
- Platform
- Windows
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 18 February 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributors
- Jonny Johnson; Vadim Khrykov
Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.[1]
Create Process with Token MITRE reference T1134.002
2 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
RPC backdoors can impersonate or steal process tokens before executing commands.1
All 2 groups for this technique
11 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Included functionality to create sub-processes with a specific user’s token.1
The WhisperGate third stage can use the AdvancedRun.exe tool to execute commands in the context of the Windows TrustedInstaller group via %TEMP%\AdvancedRun.exe" /EXEFilename "C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine "stop WinDefend" /StartDirectory "" /RunAs 8 /Run.1
Can attempt to gain administrative privileges using token impersonation.1
Can launch an instance of itself with administrative rights using runas.1
Has the ability to execute a process using runas.1
Has a command called RunAs, which creates a new process as another user or process context.1
All 11 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1134.002
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Create Process with Token detection strategy DET0456
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Behavior-chain detection for T1134.002 Create Process with Token (Windows)
AN1253 · Windows
A process (often after stealing/creating a token) calls CreateProcessWithTokenW/CreateProcessAsUserW or uses runas to spawn a **new** process whose security context (SID/LogonId/IntegrityLevel) differs from its parent. Chain: (1) suspicious command/API → (2) privileged handle or token duplication/open → (3) new child process running as another user / higher integrity → (4) optional follow‑on privileged/lateral actions.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| OS API ExecutionDC0021 | ETW:ProcThread | api_call: CreateProcessWithTokenW, CreateProcessAsUserW |
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4688 |
| Process AccessDC0035 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=10 |
| Active Directory Object ModificationDC0066 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=5136 |
| Logon Session MetadataDC0088 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4672, 4634 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TimeWindow | Correlation window between API/handle access and the spawned process (default 5–10 minutes). |
| AllowedImpersonators | Service accounts/binaries legitimately using CreateProcessWithTokenW (e.g., PsExec service, SCCM, backup agents). |
| IntegrityEscalationDelta | Minimum jump in integrity level (e.g., Medium→System) to flag. |
| ParentChildUserMismatch | Treat any parent/child SID or LogonId mismatch as suspicious unless on allow-list. |
| SensitiveTargets | List of processes (e.g., lsass.exe, winlogon.exe, services.exe) whose token access prior to the spawn raises score. |
Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.
Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas.
An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition