LIGHTWIRE is a web shell written in Perl that was used during Cutting Edge to maintain access and enable command execution by imbedding into the legitimate compcheckresult.cgi component of Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.[1][2]
5
TechniquesBottom 23%
3
TacticsBottom 21%
0
Threat groupsNone recorded
1
Campaignunranked
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques5Bottom 23%
23rd percentile · 77% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics3Bottom 21%
21st percentile · 79% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat groups061% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaign185% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique20med47th pct
47th percentile · 53% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique1medBottom 5%
5th percentile · 95% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more atomic tests per technique.
Data comps / technique5med54% tie · 11 values
54% of the population shares a single value across only 11 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Mitigations / technique1med57th pct
57th percentile · 57% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many mitigations per technique or fewer.
5 of 8 axes carry an honest rank on this page. Coverage medians are taken across this malware’s 5 Enterprise techniques.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
The following analytic detects the use of CertUtil.exe with the 'decode' argument, which may indicate an attempt to decode a previously encoded file, potentially containing malicious payloads. (...)
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. (...)
This analytic detects the usage of the Utility osascript on a macOS device initiated a network connection lasting longer than 10 minutes (600 seconds). (...)
The following analytic detects the use of known suspicious SSL certificates in any observed event where the SSL_CertFingerprint field is present. (...)
The following analytic detects connections with a high Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) threat confidence score, indicating potentially malicious behavior within encrypted traffic. (...)
This analytic detects HTTP requests to privileged execution paths on Cisco routers, specifically targeting the `/level/15/exec/-/*` endpoint using Cisco Secure Firewall Intrusion Events. (...)
The following analytic identifies the creation of suspicious .aspx files in known drop locations for Exchange exploitation, specifically targeting paths associated with HAFNIUM group and vulnerabilities like ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell. (...)
The following analytic hunts for any creations or modifications to GitHub Actions workflow YAML files across the organization's Linux or Windows endpoints. (...)
HTTP request smuggling is a technique for interfering with the way a web site processes sequences of HTTP requests that are received from one or more users. (...)
The following analytic detects HTTP POST requests containing heavily encoded data in the post body, specifically looking for sequences of hex-encoded bytes or base64-encoded strings. (...)
This detection identifies rapid-fire POST request attacks where an attacker sends more than 20 POST requests within a 5-second window, potentially attempting to exploit race conditions or overwhelm request handling. (...)
Detects attempts to exploit a request smuggling technique against IIS that leverages a Windows quirk where requests for reserved Windows device names such as "/con" trigger an early server response before the request body is received. (...)
This Splunk query analyzes web logs to identify and categorize user agents, detecting various types of Remote Monitoring and Mangement applications. (...)