CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch; Liran Ravich, CardinalOps; Jamie Williams (U ω U), PANW Unit 42
Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.
Adversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently collect credentials during logins (i.e., Modify Authentication Process).[1]
An adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)[2] prior to the binary’s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.[3]
After modifying a binary, an adversary may attempt to impair defenses by preventing it from updating (e.g., via the yum-versionlock command or versionlock.list file in Linux systems that use the yum package manager).[4]
56th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
2 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has trojanized Fortinet firmware and replaced the legitimate /usr/bin/tac_plus TACACS+ daemon for Linux with a malicious version containing credential logging functionality.12
Has modified legitimate binaries and scripts for Pulse Secure VPNs including the legitimate DSUpgrade.pm file to install the ATRIUM webshell for persistence.12
created 2024-02-052 referencesaka Mulberry Typhoon
All 2 groups for this technique
3 campaigns have been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
19 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Has established persistence through modifying software binaries to include AI coding agents’ configuration or setting files that act as hooks, tasks or execution triggers.1
Has modified legitimate components to enable persistence and execution, including inserting a web shell into getComponent.cgi and restAuth.cgi, modifying DSUpgrade.pm to block system upgrades, and overwriting remotedebug to execute arbitrary commands when specific parameters are provided.1
Contains a watchdog-like feature that monitors a particular file for modification. If modification is detected, the legitimate file is backed up and replaced with a trojanized file to allow for persistence through likely system upgrades.1
Uses DLL unhooking to remove user mode inline hooks that security solutions often implement. BFG Agonizer also uses IAT unhooking to remove user-mode IAT hooks that security solutions also use.1
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 4 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detect Compromise of Host Software Binaries
Enterprise
4 platforms
AN0949 · Windows
Monitors for unexpected modifications of system or application binaries, particularly signed executables. Correlates file write events with subsequent unsigned or anomalously signed process execution, and checks for tampered binaries outside normal patch cycles.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
MonitoredPaths
Define critical directories (e.g., C:\Windows\System32, Program Files) for binary integrity checks
SignatureValidation
Adjust enforcement level of digital signature verification based on enterprise risk appetite
TimeWindow
Correlate file modification with subsequent process execution within a defined time window
AN0950 · Linux
Detects modification of system or application binaries by monitoring /usr/bin, /bin, and other privileged directories. Correlates file integrity monitoring (FIM) events with unexpected process executions or service restarts.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
WatchedDirectories
Customize monitored directories (e.g., /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, /opt/apps) for binary tampering
BaselineHashes
Maintain golden file hashes for integrity validation
AN0951 · macOS
Monitors binary modification in /Applications and system library paths. Detects unsigned or improperly signed binaries executed after modification. Tracks Gatekeeper or notarization bypass attempts tied to modified binaries.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
ApplicationPaths
Tune which application and library directories are monitored for tampering
SignatureVerificationDepth
Define strictness of code-signing validation checks
AN0952 · ESXi
Detects unauthorized modification of host binaries, modules, or services within ESXi. Correlates tampered files with subsequent unexpected service behavior or malicious module load attempts.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
The following analytic hunts for any creations or modifications to GitHub Actions workflow YAML files across the organization's Linux or Windows endpoints. (...)
Detects file creation indicators associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign targeting TanStack npm packages and others such as mistralai, uipath, etc reported on early May 2026.