Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques2Bottom 7%
7th percentile · 93% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics2Bottom 12%
12th percentile · 88% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat group161% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique9medBottom 13%
13th percentile · 87% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique3med
HIDEDRV detections S0135
18 distinct rules cover the 2 techniques recorded for this malware. 9 Sigma · 9 Splunk.
2 covered by at least one rule18 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-18 of 18 rules
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Detects potential use of CreateRemoteThread api and LoadLibrary function to inject DLL into a proces (...)
This detection identifies file creation events associated with the installation of the Medusa rootkit, a userland LD_PRELOAD-based rootkit known for deploying shared objects, loader binaries, and configuration files into specific system directories. (...)
The following analytic detects PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) evidence of a complete P/Invoke process-injection API chain at either the compile phase or the execution phase. (...)
The following analytic identifies the creation of a remote thread by a process such as wermgr.exe or rundll32.exe into a browser process such as firefox.exe, chrome.exe, and others. (...)