tfMITRE ATT&CK sub-technique

Mavinject T1218.013

sub-technique of T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution

Tactic: Stealth
Platform: Windows
Version: 3.0
Created: 22 September 2021
Last modified: 12 May 2026

Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).[1]

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groupsNone recorded

Threat groupsNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malware44th pct

Tools & malware44th percentile · 56% of ATT&CK techniques have more tools implementing them.

Detection rules54th pct

Detection rules54th percentile · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

Mavinject MITRE reference T1218.013

44th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of tools

1 software entry is documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.

TONESHELLS1239 ↗

Has injected its malicious payload into a running process through Windows utility Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector MAVInject.exe.1

created 2025-09-15MALWAREcarried by 1 group

All 1 software entries for this technique

Offense vs defense T1218.013

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 2Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 1

first rule: 2021 Q3

Mavinject detection strategy DET0433

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detecting Code Injection via mavinject.exe (App-V Injector)

Enterprise

1 platform

AN1207 · Windows

Abuse of mavinject.exe to inject DLLs or import descriptors into another running process. Chain: (1) mavinject.exe starts with /INJECTRUNNING or /HMODULE → (2) mavinject obtains high-access handles to a target process (VM_WRITE/CREATE_THREAD) → (3) target process loads attacker DLL (module load) → (4) optional follow-on child activity or network egress from the target process.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Module LoadDC0016	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=7
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=4688
Process AccessDC0035	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=10
File CreationDC0039	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=11
Command ExecutionDC0064	WinEventLog:PowerShell	EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106
Network Connection CreationDC0082	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=3, 22

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
TimeWindow	Correlation interval (e.g., 5–10 minutes) linking mavinject start → ProcessAccess → module load/network from the target process.
DLLPathRegex	Patterns for suspicious DLL locations (e.g., %TEMP%, Downloads, UNC shares) to reduce noise from legitimate injections.
TargetProcessAllowList	Common legitimate targets for App-V (if used) to suppress; flag unusual targets like browsers, LSASS, Winlogon, EDR processes.
MinGrantedAccessSet	Set of access rights that imply injection (VM_WRITE, VM_OPERATION, CREATE_THREAD). Tune for your EDR/sysmon formatting.
ParentProcessFilter	Legitimate parents starting mavinject (e.g., App-V services) vs. suspicious parents (Office, script hosts, browsers).
ExternalIPAllowlist	Known enterprise update/CDN ranges to exclude when correlating post-injection network activity.
SignedToUnsignedTransition	Alerting when Microsoft-signed mavinject leads to loading unsigned DLLs in a target process.

Mavinject detections T1218.013

3 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

54th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

Severity

Library

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