Dark Caracal is threat group that has been attributed to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) and has operated since at least 2012. [1]
12
Techniques39th pct
8
Tactics48th pct
3
Tools & malware47th pct
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
Dark Caracal's version of Bandook communicates with their server over a TCP port using HTTP payloads Base64 encoded and suffixed with the string “&&&”.6
Dark Caracal collected file listings of all default Windows directories.7
Discovery29 detection rules
Standing G0070
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this group touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 176 ATT&CK groups only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques1239th pct
39th percentile · 61% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics848th pct
48th percentile · 52% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tactics spanned.
Tools & malware347th pct
47th percentile · 53% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tools and malware.
Campaigns089% tie · 4 values
89% of the population shares a single value across only 4 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique18.5med49th pct
49th percentile · 51% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique5med
Dark Caracal detections G0070
311 distinct rules cover the 12 techniques recorded for this group. 222 Sigma · 89 Splunk.
11 covered by at least one rule1 with no coverage311 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 300+ rules
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Title
Description
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Event
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Severity
Author
Created
Updated
ID
Refs
Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database). (...)
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
The following analytic detects the creation of a batch file (.bat) within the Windows system directory tree, specifically in the System32 or SysWOW64 folders. (...)
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. (...)
This analytic detects the usage of the Utility osascript on a macOS device initiated a network connection lasting longer than 10 minutes (600 seconds). (...)
The following analytic detects the use of known suspicious SSL certificates in any observed event where the SSL_CertFingerprint field is present. (...)
The following analytic detects connections with a high Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) threat confidence score, indicating potentially malicious behavior within encrypted traffic. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of `cmd.exe /c` to execute commands, a technique often employed by adversaries and malware to run batch commands or invoke other shells like PowerShell. (...)
The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) spawning a child process, indicating the use of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file to execute Windows script code. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) using InfoTech Storage Handlers to load Windows script code from a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file. (...)
The following analytic detects executions of cmd.exe spawned by processes that are commonly abused by attackers and do not typically launch cmd.exe. (...)
The following detects the execution of cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes spawned by cmd.exe, leveraging Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry mapped to the Endpoint data model, with additional contextual filtering to improve fidelity and reduce false positives. (...)