Suckfly used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.5
Suckfly has used stolen certificates to sign its malware.6
Defense Impairment1 detection rules
Standing G0039
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this group touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 176 ATT&CK groups only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques5Bottom 16%
16th percentile · 84% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics848th pct
48th percentile · 52% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tactics spanned.
Tool or malware1Bottom 23%
23rd percentile · 77% of 176 ATT&CK groups have more tools and malware.
Campaigns089% tie · 4 values
89% of the population shares a single value across only 4 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique51medTop 7%
93rd percentile · 93% of 176 ATT&CK groups have this many detection rules per technique or fewer.
Tests / technique6med
Suckfly detections G0039
244 distinct rules cover the 5 techniques recorded for this group. 169 Sigma · 75 Splunk.
5 covered by at least one rule244 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 200+ rules
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Title
Description
Category
Status
Event
OS
Product
MITRE ATT&CK
CVEs
Severity
Author
Created
Updated
ID
Refs
Detects file access requests to browser credential stores by uncommon processes. (...)
Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1', Tim Shelton
2022-08-11
2022-08-18
6f583da0-3a90-4566-a4ed-83c09fe18bbf
This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted.
Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
2022-06-01
—
248649b7-d64f-46f0-9fb2-a52774166fb5
Resource owner password credentials (ROPC) should be avoided if at all possible as this requires the user to expose their current password credentials to the application directly. (...)
Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
2022-06-01
—
55695bc0-c8cf-461f-a379-2535f563c854
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
The following analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, privilege escalation, password dumping or data exfiltration. (...)
Identifies two sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also be atypical for the user, given past behavior.
The following analytic detects unusual authentication activity in Azure AD, specifically when a single user account has over 8 authentication attempts using 3+ unique application IDs and 5+ unique user agents within a short period. (...)
Detects a successful login to the Microsoft Intune Company Portal which could allow bypassing Conditional Access Policies and InTune device trust using a tool like TokenSmith.
This analytic detects the creation of privileged user accounts on Cisco IOS devices, which could indicate an attacker establishing backdoor access. (...)
This analytic correlates risk events between privileged account creation on Cisco IOS devices and HTTP requests to privileged execution paths such as `/level/15/exec/-/*`. (...)
The following analytic detects the use of `cmd.exe /c` to execute commands, a technique often employed by adversaries and malware to run batch commands or invoke other shells like PowerShell. (...)