Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation intercepted and harvested credentials from user logins to compromised devices.2
campaign
Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation C0039
- First seen
- June 2024
- Last seen
- August 2024
- Created
- 27 August 2024
- Last modified
- 31 July 2026
Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation was conducted by Volt Typhoon from early June through August 2024 as zero-day exploitation of Versa Director servers controlling software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN) applications. Since tracked as CVE-2024-39717, exploitation focused on credential capture from compromised Versa Director servers at managed service providers (MSPs) and internet service providers (ISPs) to enable follow-on access to service provider clients. Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation was followed by the delivery of the VersaMem web shell for both credential theft and follow-on code execution.[1]
8
TechniquesBottom 21%
6
Tactics34th pct
1
Tool or malware45th pct
1
Threat groupunranked
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
MITRE reference C0039
Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation established HTTPS communications from adversary-controlled SOHO devices over port 443 with compromised Versa Director servers.3
Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation used a non-standard TCP session to initialize communication prior to establishing HTTPS command and control.4
Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation involved exploitation of a vulnerability in Versa Director servers, since identified as CVE-2024-39717, for initial access and code execution.5
Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation resulted in the deployment of the VersaMem web shell for follow-on activity.6
Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation used HTTPS for command and control of compromised Versa Director servers.7
Standing C0039
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this campaign touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 56 ATT&CK campaigns only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques8Bottom 21%
21st percentile · 79% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics634th pct
34th percentile · 66% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more tactics spanned.
Tool or malware145th pct
45th percentile · 55% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more tools and malware.
Threat group155% tie · 3 values
55% of the population shares a single value across only 3 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique8.5medBottom 20%
20th percentile · 80% of 56 ATT&CK campaigns have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique0med
Detection coverage C0039
368 distinct rules cover the 8 techniques recorded for this campaign. The 398 technique-to-rule mappings resolve to 368 distinct rules, because one rule can cover several techniques. 234 Sigma · 134 Splunk.
7 covered by at least one rule1 with no coverage368 distinct rules in total
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