Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure T1578
- Tactic
- Defense Impairment
- Platform
- IaaS
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 30 August 2019
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots.
Offense vs defense T1578
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure detection strategy DET0308
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
AN0861 · IaaS
Detection focuses on identifying unauthorized or anomalous changes to compute infrastructure components. Defender perspective: monitor for creation, deletion, or modification of instances, volumes, and snapshots outside of approved change management windows; correlate abnormal activity such as rapid snapshot creation followed by new instance mounts, or repeated infrastructure changes by rarely used accounts. Flagging activity linked to unusual geolocation, API client, or automation script is suspicious.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Snapshot DeletionDC0049 | AWS:CloudTrail | DeleteSnapshot |
| Snapshot CreationDC0057 | AWS:CloudTrail | CreateSnapshot |
| Snapshot ModificationDC0058 | AWS:CloudTrail | ModifySnapshotAttribute |
| Cloud Service MetadataDC0070 | AWS:CloudWatch | unexpected IAM user or role assuming privileges for instance/snapshot operations |
| Instance StartDC0080 | AWS:CloudTrail | RunInstances |
| Instance StopDC0089 | AWS:CloudTrail | TerminateInstances |
| Volume ModificationDC0092 | AWS:CloudTrail | ModifyVolume |
| Volume CreationDC0097 | AWS:CloudTrail | CreateVolume |
| Volume DeletionDC0098 | AWS:CloudTrail | DeleteVolume, ModifyVolume |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| ChangeWindow | Approved maintenance or deployment windows. Helps reduce false positives by distinguishing scheduled activity. |
| UserContext | IAM user, role, or service account performing the operation. Tunable to allowlist known automation services. |
| RateThreshold | Number of infrastructure changes (e.g., snapshot creations) in a defined period. Adjusted based on workload scale. |
| GeoLocation | Region or source IP where changes originate. Useful for tuning alerts to account for multi-region deployments. |
Routinely monitor user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to modify cloud compute infrastructure components.
Limit permissions for creating, deleting, and otherwise altering compute components in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles and policies.