Modify Cloud Compute Configurations T1578.005
- Tactic
- Defense Impairment
- Platform
- IaaS
- Version
- 3.0
- Created
- 05 September 2023
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributors
- Amir Gharib, Microsoft Threat Intelligence; Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim’s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim.
Offense vs defense T1578.005
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Modify Cloud Compute Configurations detection strategy DET0492
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Modify Cloud Compute Configurations
AN1356 · IaaS
Defenders should monitor for anomalous or unauthorized changes to cloud compute configurations that alter quotas, tenant-wide policies, subscription associations, or allowed deployment regions. From a defender’s perspective, suspicious behavior chains include a sudden increase in compute quota requests followed by new instance or resource creation, policy modifications that weaken security restrictions, or enabling previously unused/unsupported cloud regions. Correlation across identity, configuration, and subsequent provisioning logs is critical to distinguish legitimate administrative activity from adversarial abuse.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud Service ModificationDC0069 | AWS:CloudTrail | RequestServiceQuotaIncrease |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| UserContext | Identity performing the quota or configuration change; tuned to filter known admins or automation accounts. |
| TimeWindow | Correlation period for configuration change followed by resource creation; tuned to environment norms. |
| ChangeType | Type of configuration being modified (quota, policy, region); tuned to organization-specific risk thresholds. |
| GeoLocation | Region where the configuration change originates; tuned to enterprise’s expected operational geography. |
Routinely monitor user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to request quota adjustments or modify tenant-level compute settings.
Limit permissions to request quotas adjustments or modify tenant-level compute setting to only those required.