Has created Amazon EC2 instances within the victim's environment.1
Create Cloud Instance T1578.002
- Tactic
- Defense Impairment
- Platform
- IaaS
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 14 May 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributor
- Arun Seelagan, CISA
An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may Create Snapshot of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect Data from Local System or for Remote Data Staging.[1]
Create Cloud Instance MITRE reference T1578.002
2 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Has created new virtual machines within the target's cloud environment after leveraging credential access to cloud assets.1
All 2 groups for this technique
1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
During C0027, Scattered Spider used access to the victim's Azure tenant to create Azure VMs.1
All 1 campaigns for this technique
Offense vs defense T1578.002
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Create Cloud Instance detection strategy DET0449
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 1 analytic, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detection Strategy for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud Instance
AN1242 · IaaS
Detection focuses on abnormal or unauthorized cloud instance creation events. From a defender’s perspective, suspicious behavior includes VM/instance creation by rarely used or newly created accounts, creation events from unusual geolocations, or rapid sequences of snapshot creation followed by instance creation and mounting. Unexpected network or IAM policy changes applied to new instances can indicate adversarial use rather than legitimate provisioning.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Instance CreationDC0076 | azure:activity | MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/WRITE |
| Instance StartDC0080 | AWS:CloudTrail | RunInstances |
| Instance MetadataDC0086 | AWS:CloudTrail | DescribeInstances |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| UserContext | IAM user, service account, or role creating the instance. Tuned to allowlist known automation services. |
| GeoLocation | Region or source IP where the creation request originates. Helps detect cross-region or unusual location abuse. |
| RateThreshold | Number of instances created per user or account in a time window. Tuned for environments with elastic scaling. |
| TaggingPolicy | Expected tags (e.g., owner, purpose, cost center) for new instances. Deviations may indicate adversarial creation. |
Routinely check user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to create new instances.
Limit permissions for creating new instances in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles and policies.
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition