FIN13G1016 ↗
Has replaced legitimate KeePass binaries with trojanized versions to collect passwords from numerous applications.1
tfMITRE ATT&CK technique
Modify Authentication Process T1556
- Platforms
- IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows
- Version
- 3.0
- Created
- 11 February 2020
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributor
- Chris Ross @xorrior
Sub-techniques 950 rules across the family · 31 mapped directly to T1556 · 3 of 9 carry rules
Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.
ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact
1
Threat groups45th pct
Threat groups45th percentile · 55% of ATT&CK techniques have more threat groups attributed.1
Campaigns72nd pct
Campaigns72nd percentile · 72% of ATT&CK techniques have this many campaigns recorded or fewer.4
Tools & malware62nd pct
Tools & malware62nd percentile · 62% of ATT&CK techniques have this many tools implementing them or fewer.31
Detection rulesTop 8%
Detection rules92nd percentile · 92% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.Modify Authentication Process MITRE reference T1556
45th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
All 1 groups for this technique
1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
All 1 campaigns for this technique
4 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
DRYHOOKS9013 ↗
Has intercepted and logged user credentials by modifying the Perl module in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN edge-devices located within /home/perl/DSAuth.pm.12
SILENTTRINITYS0692 ↗
Can create a backdoor in KeePass using a malicious config file and in TortoiseSVN using a registry hook.1
KesselS0487 ↗
Has trojanized the <sode>ssh_login</code> and user-auth_pubkey functions to steal plaintext credentials.1
EburyS0377 ↗
Can intercept private keys using a trojanized ssh-add function.1
All 4 software entries for this technique
Offense vs defense T1556
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Range
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Campaigns · 1Sigma rules (cumulative) · 12Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 19
first rule: 2020 Q4 · 1 of 1 campaigns plottedModify Authentication Process detection strategy DET0104
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 5 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detect Modification of Authentication Processes Across Platforms
5 platforms
AN0287 · Windows
Detects modification of LSASS and authentication DLLs, suspicious registry changes to password filter packages, and abnormal process access to lsass.exe. Correlates registry modifications, DLL loads, and process handle access events.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Module LoadDC0016 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=7 |
| Process AccessDC0035 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=10 |
| Windows Registry Key ModificationDC0063 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4657 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| MonitoredRegistryKeys | Specific LSASS and password filter registry paths monitored for modification. |
| TimeWindow | Correlation window between registry change, DLL load, and lsass.exe access. |
AN0288 · Linux
Detects modification of PAM configuration files, unauthorized new PAM modules, and suspicious process execution accessing PAM-related binaries. Correlates file modification events in /etc/pam.d/ with process execution of unauthorized binaries.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | auditd:SYSCALL | execve |
| File ModificationDC0061 | auditd:SYSCALL | open, write |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| WatchedPaths | Critical PAM directories and configuration files monitored for modification. |
AN0289 · macOS
Detects unauthorized additions or changes to /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins and suspicious process activity attempting to hook authentication APIs. Correlates file modifications with abnormal plugin loads in authentication flows.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process AccessDC0035 | macos:osquery | process_open |
| File ModificationDC0061 | macos:unifiedlog | SecurityAgentPlugins modification |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| PluginPaths | List of approved authentication plugin directories to baseline. |
AN0290 · Identity Provider
Detects suspicious configuration changes in IdP authentication flows such as enabling reversible password encryption, MFA bypass, or policy weakening. Correlates policy modification events with unusual administrative activity.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account ModificationDC0010 | m365:unified | Set-ADUser OR Set-ADAccountControl |
| Cloud Service ModificationDC0069 | azure:policy | UpdatePolicy |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| PolicyBaseline | Expected authentication-related policy configurations to compare against. |
AN0291 · IaaS
Detects unauthorized changes to IAM authentication configurations such as disabling MFA, creating backdoor access keys, or altering trust policies. Correlates identity policy updates with unusual login behavior.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account ModificationDC0010 | AWS:CloudTrail | UpdateLoginProfile |
| Cloud Service ModificationDC0069 | AWS:CloudTrail | UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| ApprovedAccounts | Baseline list of service accounts expected to modify IAM authentication policies. |
AuditM1047
Review authentication logs to ensure that mechanisms such as enforcement of MFA are functioning as intended.
Periodically review the hybrid identity solution in use for any discrepancies. For example, review all Pass Through Authentication (PTA) agents in the Azure Management Portal to identify any unwanted or unapproved ones. If ADFS is in use, review DLLs and executable files in the AD FS and Global Assembly Cache directories to ensure that they are signed by Microsoft. Note that in some cases binaries may be catalog-signed, which may cause the file to appear unsigned when viewing file properties.
Periodically review for new and unknown network provider DLLs within the Registry (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<NetworkProviderName>\NetworkProvider\ProviderPath). Ensure only valid network provider DLLs are registered. The name of these can be found in the Registry key at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order, and have corresponding service subkey pointing to a DLL at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentC ontrolSet\Services\<NetworkProviderName>\NetworkProvider.
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecting information. MFA can also be used to restrict access to cloud resources and APIs.
Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\Windows\System32\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages.
Starting in Windows 11 22H2, the EnableMPRNotifications policy can be disabled through Group Policy or through a configuration service provider to prevent Winlogon from sending credentials to network providers.
Password PoliciesM1027
Ensure that AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property is set to disabled unless there are application requirements.
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying protected components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities. Limit on-premises accounts with access to the hybrid identity solution in place. For example, limit Azure AD Global Administrator accounts to only those required, and ensure that these are dedicated cloud-only accounts rather than hybrid ones.
Enabled features, such as Protected Process Light (PPL), for LSA.
Restrict write access to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.
Restrict Registry permissions to disallow the modification of sensitive Registry keys such as HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order.
Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the the secure enrollment and deactivation of authentication mechanisms, such as MFA, for user accounts.