Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.
Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.
Threat groups45th percentile · 55% of ATT&CK techniques have more threat groups attributed.
1
Campaigns72nd pct
Campaigns72nd percentile · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have fewer campaigns recorded.
4
Tools & malware62nd pct
Tools & malware62nd percentile · 57% of ATT&CK techniques have fewer tools implementing them.
31
Detection rulesTop 8%
Detection rules92nd percentile · 91% of ATT&CK techniques have fewer detection rules written.
Modify Authentication Process MITRE reference T1556
45th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Included modification of the AAA process to bypass authentication mechanisms.1
2023–2024
All 1 campaigns for this technique
4 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Has intercepted and logged user credentials by modifying the Perl module in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN edge-devices located within /home/perl/DSAuth.pm.12
Modify Authentication Process detection strategy DET0104
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 5 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detect Modification of Authentication Processes Across Platforms
Enterprise
5 platforms
AN0287 · Windows
Detects modification of LSASS and authentication DLLs, suspicious registry changes to password filter packages, and abnormal process access to lsass.exe. Correlates registry modifications, DLL loads, and process handle access events.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
MonitoredRegistryKeys
Specific LSASS and password filter registry paths monitored for modification.
TimeWindow
Correlation window between registry change, DLL load, and lsass.exe access.
AN0288 · Linux
Detects modification of PAM configuration files, unauthorized new PAM modules, and suspicious process execution accessing PAM-related binaries. Correlates file modification events in /etc/pam.d/ with process execution of unauthorized binaries.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
WatchedPaths
Critical PAM directories and configuration files monitored for modification.
AN0289 · macOS
Detects unauthorized additions or changes to /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins and suspicious process activity attempting to hook authentication APIs. Correlates file modifications with abnormal plugin loads in authentication flows.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
Field
What you tune
PolicyBaseline
Expected authentication-related policy configurations to compare against.
AN0291 · IaaS
Detects unauthorized changes to IAM authentication configurations such as disabling MFA, creating backdoor access keys, or altering trust policies. Correlates identity policy updates with unusual login behavior.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
Review authentication logs to ensure that mechanisms such as enforcement of MFA are functioning as intended.
Periodically review the hybrid identity solution in use for any discrepancies. For example, review all Pass Through Authentication (PTA) agents in the Azure Management Portal to identify any unwanted or unapproved ones. If ADFS is in use, review DLLs and executable files in the AD FS and Global Assembly Cache directories to ensure that they are signed by Microsoft. Note that in some cases binaries may be catalog-signed, which may cause the file to appear unsigned when viewing file properties.
Periodically review for new and unknown network provider DLLs within the Registry (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<NetworkProviderName>\NetworkProvider\ProviderPath). Ensure only valid network provider DLLs are registered. The name of these can be found in the Registry key at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order, and have corresponding service subkey pointing to a DLL at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentC ontrolSet\Services\<NetworkProviderName>\NetworkProvider.
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecting information. MFA can also be used to restrict access to cloud resources and APIs.
Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\Windows\System32\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages.
Starting in Windows 11 22H2, the EnableMPRNotifications policy can be disabled through Group Policy or through a configuration service provider to prevent Winlogon from sending credentials to network providers.
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.
Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying protected components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.
Limit on-premises accounts with access to the hybrid identity solution in place. For example, limit Azure AD Global Administrator accounts to only those required, and ensure that these are dedicated cloud-only accounts rather than hybrid ones.
Restrict Registry permissions to disallow the modification of sensitive Registry keys such as HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order.
Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the the secure enrollment and deactivation of authentication mechanisms, such as MFA, for user accounts.
Modify Authentication Process detections T1556
31 rules are mapped to this technique.
Top 8%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules
Showing 1-31 of 31 rules
Drag headers to reorder | Drag edges to resize
Select
Title
Description
Category
Status
Event
OS
Product
MITRE ATT&CK
CVEs
Severity
Author
Created
Updated
ID
Refs
Detects a change in the AWS Identity Center (FKA AWS SSO) identity provider. (...)
The following analytic identifies instances where a Duo admin logs in using a browser other than Chrome, which is considered unusual based on typical access patterns. (...)
The following analytic detects instances where a Duo admin login originates from a country outside of the United States, which may indicate suspicious or unauthorized access attempts. (...)
The following analytic identifies Duo admin login attempts from operating systems that are unusual for your environment, excluding commonly used OS such as Mac OS X. (...)
The following analytic detects when a Duo user generates a bypass code, which allows them to circumvent multi-factor authentication (2FA) protections. (...)
The following analytic identifies instances where a Duo administrator creates or updates a policy to allow the use of outdated Flash components, specifically by detecting policy changes with the flash_remediation=no remediation attribute. (...)
The following analytic identifies instances where a Duo administrator creates or updates a policy to explicitly deny user access within the Duo environment. (...)
This analytic detects the creation or modification of network interfaces on Cisco devices, which could indicate an attacker establishing persistence or preparing for lateral movement. (...)
The following analytic identifies the deletion of registry keys that disable Local Security Authority (LSA) protection and Microsoft Defender Device Guard. (...)