After compromising user accounts, Scattered Spider registers their own MFA tokens.1
Multi-Factor Authentication T1556.006
- Platforms
- IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows
- Version
- 2.0
- Created
- 31 May 2022
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributors
- Arun Seelagan, CISA; Liran Ravich, CardinalOps; Muhammad Moiz Arshad, @5T34L7H
Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.
Multi-Factor Authentication MITRE reference T1556.006
1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
All 1 groups for this technique
1 campaign has been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries modified two-factor settings within the FortiGate solution to unset.1
All 1 campaigns for this technique
2 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can insert malicious logic to bypass RADIUS and ACE two factor authentication (2FA) flows if a designated attacker-supplied password is provided.1
The AADInternals Set-AADIntUserMFA command can be used to disable MFA for a specified user.
All 2 software entries for this technique
Offense vs defense T1556.006
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Multi-Factor Authentication detection strategy DET0190
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 7 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Detect MFA Modification or Disabling Across Platforms
AN0543 · Windows
Detects registry and Group Policy modifications that disable or weaken MFA, suspicious PowerShell usage modifying MFA-related attributes, and anomalous login sessions succeeding without expected MFA challenge.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Script ExecutionDC0029 | WinEventLog:PowerShell | Set-ADUser or Set-ADAuthenticationPolicy with MFA attributes disabled |
| Active Directory Object ModificationDC0066 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4739 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| WatchedAttributes | List of AD attributes or policy fields tied to MFA enforcement that may vary by organization. |
| TimeWindow | Correlation window between MFA policy changes and anomalous login behavior. |
AN0544 · Identity Provider
Detects conditional access policy changes, exclusion of accounts from MFA enforcement, or registration of new MFA factors by non-admin or anomalous users.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account ModificationDC0010 | m365:unified | User excluded from MFA or MFA method registered |
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | azure:signinlogs | Modify Conditional Access Policy |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| PrivilegedRoles | Roles permitted to modify MFA settings in IdP; helps tune detection of unauthorized changes. |
AN0545 · IaaS
Detects API calls to cloud secrets/MFA configurations where MFA enforcement policies are disabled or bypassed.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud Service ModificationDC0069 | AWS:CloudTrail | UpdateIdentityPolicy or DisableMFA |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| MonitoredServices | Specific cloud services or IAM policies relevant to MFA enforcement. |
AN0546 · Linux
Detects PAM module modifications or removal of MFA hooks in /etc/pam.d/ configurations, correlated with successful authentications lacking MFA prompts.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account AuthenticationDC0002 | NSM:Connections | Successful login without expected MFA challenge |
| File ModificationDC0061 | auditd:SYSCALL | open/write to /etc/pam.d/* |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| MFAHooks | Paths to organization-specific PAM modules enforcing MFA. |
AN0547 · macOS
Detects modifications to authorization plugins responsible for MFA enforcement and correlates with suspicious login sessions missing MFA prompts.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account AuthenticationDC0002 | macos:unifiedlog | Login success without MFA step |
| File ModificationDC0061 | macos:unifiedlog | Modification of /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| WatchedPluginPaths | Paths to organization-deployed MFA authorization plugins. |
AN0548 · SaaS
Detects suspicious MFA method changes, such as registration of weaker factors (e.g., SMS), or removal of MFA requirements for specific accounts or groups.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| User Account ModificationDC0010 | saas:zoom | DisableMFA or RegisterNewFactor |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| AcceptedFactors | Configured MFA factors allowed in SaaS environment; tuned to organizational policies. |
AN0549 · Office Suite
Detects MFA bypass attempts by modifying tenant-wide authentication policies or excluding high-value accounts from MFA enforcement.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Application Log ContentDC0038 | m365:unified | Set-CsOnlineUser or UpdateAuthPolicy |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| MonitoredPolicies | Specific tenant or suite policies tied to MFA enforcement. |
Review MFA actions alongside authentication logs to ensure that MFA-based logins are functioning as intended. Review user accounts to ensure that all accounts have MFA enabled.
Ensure that MFA and MFA policies and requirements are properly implemented for existing and deactivated or dormant accounts and devices. If possible, consider configuring MFA solutions to "fail closed" rather than grant access in case of serious errors.
Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the secure enrollment and deactivation of MFA for user accounts.