tfMITRE ATT&CK technique

Hardware Additions T1200

Tactic: Initial Access
Platforms: Windows, Linux, macOS
Version: 1.7
Created: 18 April 2018
Last modified: 24 October 2025

Adversaries may physically introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. Replication Through Removable Media), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.

ReconResource DevInitial AccessExecutionPersistencePriv EscStealthDef ImpairmentCred AccessDiscoveryLateral MoveCollectionC2ExfiltrationImpact

Threat groups45th pct

Threat groups45th percentile · 55% of ATT&CK techniques have more threat groups attributed.

CampaignsNone recorded

CampaignsNone recorded · 54% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Tools & malwareNone recorded

Tools & malwareNone recorded · 29% of ATT&CK techniques have none either.

Detection rulesTop 19%

Detection rules81st percentile · 81% of ATT&CK techniques have this many detection rules written or fewer.

Hardware Additions MITRE reference T1200

45th pctamong all ATT&CK techniques for number of groups

1 group has been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.

DarkVishnyaG0105 ↗

Physically connected Bash Bunny, Raspberry Pi, netbooks, and inexpensive laptops to the target organization's environment to access the company’s local network.1

created 2020-05-151 reference

All 1 groups for this technique

Offense vs defense T1200

Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.

How it got here

Range

Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.

Campaigns · 0Sigma rules (cumulative) · 3Splunk ESCU (cumulative) · 10

first rule: 2017 Q4

Hardware Additions detection strategy DET0069

MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.

Detect unauthorized or suspicious Hardware Additions (USB/Thunderbolt/Network)

Enterprise

3 platforms

AN0185 · Windows

Chain: (1) a new external device is recognized by Windows (USB/Thunderbolt/PCIe) or a new block device appears; (2) within a short window, the same user/session spawns processes or the OS mounts a new volume; (3) optional follow-on activity such as HID keystroke injection, DMA driver load, or new network interface MAC on DHCP. Correlate Security EID 6416 / Kernel-PnP with sysmon and DHCP/network metadata.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Module LoadDC0016	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=7
Process CreationDC0032	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=1
Application Log ContentDC0038	WinEventLog:Security	EventCode=6416
File CreationDC0039	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=11
Drive CreationDC0042	WinEventLog:System	Kernel-PnP 410/400 device install, disk added
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	wineventlog:dhcp	DHCP Lease Granted
Driver LoadDC0079	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=6
Network Connection CreationDC0082	WinEventLog:Sysmon	EventCode=3, 22

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
TrustedDeviceVIDPID	Vendor/Product IDs that are approved (e.g., keyboards, mice). Unknown/rare VID:PID raise risk.
ExpectedBusTypes	Allow-listed bus types for server classes (e.g., USB disabled on DCs).
TimeWindow	Correlation window between device recognition and follow-on process/mount/network activity (e.g., 10m–60m).
TrustedMACs	Known NIC/USB-NIC MAC addresses allowed by policy.

AN0186 · Linux

Chain: (1) udev / kernel logs show hot-plug (USB/Thunderbolt/PCIe); (2) block device created by udisks/diskarbitration; (3) optional: new network interface or DHCP lease observed. Correlate /var/log/messages|syslog, auditd SYSCALL open/creat on /dev, and DHCP/Zeek.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Application Log ContentDC0038	linux:syslog	usb * new\|thunderbolt\|pci .* added\|block.: new . device
Drive CreationDC0042	auditd:SYSCALL	mknod,open,openat
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	NSM:Flow	LEASE_GRANTED

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
BlocklistDeviceStrings	Indicators such as 'RubberDucky', 'BadUSB', unfamiliar USB-NIC chipsets.
ServerClassesNoUSB	Hosts where any USB attach should alert (DCs, hypervisors).
DHCPVlanScopes	Scopes allowed to issue leases for corp endpoints vs. guest/IoT.

AN0187 · macOS

Chain: (1) unified logs report IOUSBHost/IOThunderbolt device arrival; (2) diskarbitrationd attaches a new volume; (3) optional: config profile manipulation or new network interface MAC obtains a lease. Correlate unifiedlogs (subsystems: IOUSBHost, IOKit, diskarbitrationd), FSEvents, and DHCP/Zeek.

Log sources

The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.

Data component	Name	Channel
Application Log ContentDC0038	macos:unifiedlog	Device attached\|enumerated VID/PID
Drive CreationDC0042	macos:unifiedlog	mounted\|appeared\|DA: disk* attached
Network Traffic FlowDC0078	NSM:Flow	MAC not in allow-list acquiring IP (DHCP)

Tunable fields

MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.

Field	What you tune
ManagedUSBPolicy	MDM profile expectations for external media and Thunderbolt mode; deviations alert.
KnownAppleAccessories	VID/PID for corporate-issued docks/keyboards.

Hardware Additions detections T1200

13 rules are mapped to this technique. Parent techniques also include their sub-techniques’ rules. Click a slice or key entry to filter the table.

Top 19%of all ATT&CK techniques for number of rules

Product

Severity

Library

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