Automated Exfiltration T1020
- Tactic
- Exfiltration
- Platforms
- Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
- Version
- 1.3
- Created
- 31 May 2017
- Last modified
- 12 May 2026
- Contributor
- ExtraHop
Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection.[1]
Automated Exfiltration MITRE reference T1020
7 groups have been recorded using this technique. Newest first; each entry carries MITRE’s procedure text and a link to the group’s full record. Click a name to filter the rules below.
Delivered a PowerShell script capable of recursively scanning victim machines looking for various file types before exfiltrating identified files via HTTP.1
Has configured tools to automatically send collected files to attacker controlled servers.1
Has exfiltrated data to C2 servers using an automated script that executes every 10 minutes and after successful checks for the presence of pre-designated staged filenames.1
Has used a copy function to automatically exfiltrate sensitive data from air-gapped systems using USB storage.1
Has used modules that automatically upload gathered documents to the C2 server.1
All 7 groups for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
3 campaigns have been recorded using this technique. Listed newest first; dates are year-granularity and attribution is MITRE’s.
Included scripted exfiltration of collected data.1
During Frankenstein, the threat actors collected information via Empire, which was automatically sent back to the adversary's C2.1
During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used API queries to automatically exfiltrate large volumes of data.1
All 3 campaigns for this technique
21 software entries are documented implementing this technique. MITRE files each as a tool or as malware; newest first, then by how many groups carry them.
Can compress and encrypt data and exfiltrate it via POST to scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org. If that method fails it attempts to use a stolen GITHUB_TOKEN to create a repo and exfiltrate the data there.1
Can upload encyrpted data for exfiltration.1
Automatically sends gathered email credentials following collection to command and control servers via HTTP POST.12
Can automatically exfitrate files from compromised systems.1
Will automatically collect and exfiltrate data identified in received configuration files from command and control nodes.123
Can automatically upload collected files to its C2 server.1
All 21 software entries for this technique · 6 newest in this preview
Offense vs defense T1020
Is defensive coverage keeping up with adversary use? Eight counts, each ranked against all 697 ATT&CK techniques. Attack sits left, defense right, so a shape leaning left means adversaries are better documented here than defenders are equipped. Hover any spoke for its percentile and the share of techniques that have more. The timeline below shows when each side arrived.
How it got here
Adversary activity (campaign spans) over cumulative rule output. Each source is plotted independently from zero, so neither line includes the other. Campaign dates are year-granularity.
Automated Exfiltration detection strategy DET0397
MITRE names one behaviour worth catching for this technique and breaks it into 3 analytics, one per platform. Each carries the log sources it needs and the fields you tune per environment.
Automated Exfiltration Detection Strategy
AN1113 · Windows
Detection of automated tools or scripts periodically transmitting data to external destinations using scheduled tasks or background processes.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4688 |
| Network Connection CreationDC0082 | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=3, 22 |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| TimeWindow | Used to detect repeated exfil activity over intervals (e.g., every 5 minutes). |
| DestinationIP | Can be tuned to filter known internal or trusted destinations. |
AN1114 · Linux
Background scripts (e.g., via cron) or daemons transmitting data repeatedly to remote IPs or URLs.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process CreationDC0032 | auditd:SYSCALL | execve |
| Network Connection CreationDC0082 | NSM:Flow | Outbound Connections |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| CronJobInterval | Tunable time range for recurring tasks seen creating outbound connections. |
| UserContext | Tunable for scope — service accounts vs user accounts. |
AN1115 · macOS
Observation of LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons establishing periodic external connections indicative of automated data transfer.
Log sources
The data this analytic draws on. You do not need every component — each one you already collect covers part of it. Each links to its ATT&CK record.
| Data component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Scheduled Job CreationDC0001 | macos:cron | cron/launchd |
| Process CreationDC0032 | macos:unifiedlog | process: exec |
| Network Connection CreationDC0082 | macos:unifiedlog | network |
Tunable fields
MITRE calls these the analytic’s mutable elements: the thresholds and filters you set for your own environment.
| Field | What you tune |
|---|---|
| LaunchInterval | Frequency of task recurrence linked to external communication. |
| DestinationPort | Port number used for detection filtering. |
Tests from Atomic Red Team (MIT licence) · technique definition