MiniBrowse is a custom stealer designed for the theft of credentials in browsers and passwords stores. MiniBrowse was first observed in late-2025.[1]MiniBrowse has been affiliated with the cyber espionage threat group NIMBUS MANTICORE.[1]
11
Techniques51st pct
6
Tactics54th pct
1
Threat groupunranked
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
MiniBrowse has leveraged JSON to exfiltrate data.8
Execution36 detection rules
Standing S9062
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 842 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques1151st pct
51st percentile · 51% of 842 ATT&CK software entries have this many Enterprise techniques or fewer.
Tactics654th pct
54th percentile · 54% of 842 ATT&CK software entries have this many tactics spanned or fewer.
Threat group162% tie · 22 values
62% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns086% tie · 8 values
86% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique16med38th pct
38th percentile · 62% of 842 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique7med62nd pct
62nd percentile · 62% of 842 ATT&CK software entries have this many atomic tests per technique or fewer.
Data comps / technique4med53% tie · 11 values
53% of the population shares a single value across only 11 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Mitigations / technique2medTop 8%
92nd percentile · 92% of 842 ATT&CK software entries have this many mitigations per technique or fewer.
5 of 8 axes carry an honest rank on this page. Coverage medians are taken across this malware’s 11 Enterprise techniques.
Range
Technique Campaign use over its cumulative rule count.
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
2017-11-10
2022-12-02
0bcfabcb-7929-47f4-93d6-b33fb67d34d1
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. (...)
The following analytic identifies the execution of the "whoami" command with the "/group" flag, where the results are passed to the "find" command in order to look for a the string "12288". (...)
This analytic detects the usage of the Utility osascript on a macOS device initiated a network connection lasting longer than 10 minutes (600 seconds). (...)
The following analytic detects the use of known suspicious SSL certificates in any observed event where the SSL_CertFingerprint field is present. (...)
The following analytic detects connections with a high Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) threat confidence score, indicating potentially malicious behavior within encrypted traffic. (...)
The following analytic detects potentially suspicious large volumes of data sent by the connection initiator on flows from internal to external networks. (...)
This analytic identifies Snort intrusion signatures that have been triggered by ten or more distinct internal IP addresses within a one-hour window. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of the curl utility where the command line includes percent-encoded characters and explicit file output options (such as -o or --output). (...)
The following analytic detects the creation of specific AzureHound-related files, such as `*-azurecollection.zip` and various `.json` files, on disk. (...)