CANONSTAGER has utilized custom API hashing to obfuscate the Windows APIs being used.2
tool
CANONSTAGER S1237
- Type
- malware
- Platform
- Windows
- Created
- 12 September 2025
- Last modified
- 22 October 2025
CANONSTAGER is a loader known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2025. Mustang Panda utilizes DLL side-loading to execute within the victim environment prior to delivering a follow-on malicious encrypted payload. CANONSTAGER leverages Thread Local Storage (TLS) and Native Windows APIs within the victim environment to elude detections. CANONSTAGER also hides its code utilizing window procedures and message queues.[1]
6
Techniques29th pct
3
TacticsBottom 21%
1
Threat groupunranked
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
MITRE reference S1237
CANONSTAGER has leveraged naming conventions of its malicious DLL to match legitimate services to include cnmpaui.dll which matches the legitimate executable cnmpaui.exe that is aligned with a Canon Ink Jet Printer Assistant Tool.3
CANONSTAGER uses the Thread Local Storage (TLS) array data structure to store function addresses resolved by its custom API hashing algorithm. The function addresses are later called throughout the binary from offsets into the TLS array.4
CANONSTAGER has leveraged Native API calls to execute code within the victim’s system including GetCurrentDirectoryW, RegisterClassW and CreateWindowExW.5 CANONSTAGER also created a new overlapped window that initiates callback functions to a windows procedure that processes Windows messages until a designated message type of 0x0018 WM_SHOWWINDOW is observed which then initiates the deployment of a subsequent malicious payload.5
CANONSTAGER has created a new window with a height and width of zero to remain hidden on the screen.7
CANONSTAGER has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs.8
Standing S1237
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this tool touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques629th pct
29th percentile · 71% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics3Bottom 21%
21st percentile · 79% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat group161% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique12.5medBottom 22%
22nd percentile · 78% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more detection rules per technique.
Tests / technique3med
Detection coverage S1237
161 distinct rules cover the 6 techniques recorded for this tool. The 162 technique-to-rule mappings resolve to 161 distinct rules, because one rule can cover several techniques. 135 Sigma · 26 Splunk.
4 covered by at least one rule2 with no coverage161 distinct rules in total
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