NGLite is a backdoor Trojan that is only capable of running commands received through its C2 channel. While the capabilities are standard for a backdoor, NGLite uses a novel C2 channel that leverages a decentralized network based on the legitimate NKN to communicate between the backdoor and the actors.[1]
5
TechniquesBottom 23%
2
TacticsBottom 12%
0
Threat groupsNone recorded
0
CampaignsNone recorded
Enterprise ATT&CK only. Any Mobile or ICS rows on the same ATT&CK page are not carried.
NGLite will use an AES encrypted channel for command and control purposes, in one case using the key WHATswrongwithUu.6
Command and Controlno detection rules
Standing S1106
Reach is how much of ATT&CK this malware touches. Coverage is how well defended each thing it does is, as a median per technique rather than a total — a total would just restate the reach. Each figure is ranked against all 825 ATT&CK software entries only where that population actually spreads. Where most of the population shares one value, a percentile would rank the tie instead of the entity, so the raw value is shown and no rank is claimed.
Reach
Techniques5Bottom 23%
23rd percentile · 77% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more Enterprise techniques.
Tactics2Bottom 12%
12th percentile · 88% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have more tactics spanned.
Threat groups061% tie · 22 values
61% of the population shares a single value across only 22 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Campaigns085% tie · 8 values
85% of the population shares a single value across only 8 distinct values, so a percentile here would rank the tie, not the entity.
Coverage
Rules / technique25med61st pct
61st percentile · 61% of 825 ATT&CK software entries have this many detection rules per technique or fewer.
Tests / technique4med
NGLite detections S1106
134 distinct rules cover the 5 techniques recorded for this malware. 88 Sigma · 46 Splunk.
4 covered by at least one rule1 with no coverage134 distinct rules in total
Showing 1-50 of 100+ rules
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Detects suspicious user agent strings used in APT malware in proxy logs
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. (...)
The following analytic identifies the execution of the "whoami" command with the "/group" flag, where the results are passed to the "find" command in order to look for a the string "12288". (...)
This analytic detects the usage of the Utility osascript on a macOS device initiated a network connection lasting longer than 10 minutes (600 seconds). (...)
The following analytic detects the use of known suspicious SSL certificates in any observed event where the SSL_CertFingerprint field is present. (...)
The following analytic detects connections with a high Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE) threat confidence score, indicating potentially malicious behavior within encrypted traffic. (...)
Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "storage" flag in order to retrieve information about the storage status and other related information. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments invoking the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. (...)
The following analytic detects the execution of the `GetCurrent` method from the WindowsIdentity .NET class using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). (...)
Detects the execution of whoami.exe with the /group command line flag to show group membership for the current user, account type, security identifiers (SID), and attributes.
HTTP request smuggling is a technique for interfering with the way a web site processes sequences of HTTP requests that are received from one or more users. (...)
The following analytic detects HTTP POST requests containing heavily encoded data in the post body, specifically looking for sequences of hex-encoded bytes or base64-encoded strings. (...)